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PUTTING MONEY BACK INTO 
CONSUMERS’ POCKETS: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF THE CFPB’S CIVIL PENALTY 
FUND 
Craig Cowie* 
One of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB”) pri-
mary goals is to protect consumers. Protecting consumers necessarily 
means ensuring that companies and individuals stop violating the consumer 
laws. But stopping illegal conduct in the future does not help the consumers 
who have already been harmed. In many of the cases prosecuted by the 
CFPB, the defendants illegally took money out of the pockets of consumers: 
they charged fees that were expressly illegal; they charged consumers more 
than the consumers owed or more than the defendants had disclosed; and 
they deceived consumers about what the consumers were buying or how 
much it would cost. Remediating this harm—giving back money actually 
taken from consumers through the defendants’ illegal conduct—is an es-
sential part of protecting consumers, and through the end of its 2019 fiscal 
year, the CFPB often required the defendants to pay consumers directly for 
the harm identified by the CFPB.  
In approximately 13% of the cases in which some relief was ordered, 
however, the defendants did not have the financial wherewithal to remedi-
ate consumers fully: they were bankrupt; they were banned from their re-
spective industries or ordered to cease operations altogether; and in some 
cases, the principals were jailed. If consumers had to rely on these defend-
ants for relief, they likely would be, quite simply, out of luck. Through the 
use of a previously unstudied mechanism, the Civil Penalty Fund, however, 
the CFPB is providing relief to all of them—hundreds of thousands of con-
sumers across twenty-seven cases. Congress created the Fund in the Dodd-
Frank Act and required that all civil money penalties collected by the CFPB 
be placed into the Fund. Further, Congress required that the CFPB use the 
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Fund in the first instance to provide monetary relief to consumers who oth-
erwise would not receive compensation for harm caused by the defendants 
in CFPB enforcement actions.  
And the defendants in these twenty-seven cases caused hundreds of 
thousands of consumers substantial amounts of monetary harm. Despite the 
fact that these companies had limited resources, they caused a total of 
$671.2 million in uncompensated harm with an average of over $24.9 mil-
lion per case and a median of $10 million per case. Through the end of the 
CFPB’s 2019 fiscal year, the CFPB had used the Fund to send more than 
905,000 checks, with an overall average of $494. In 70% of the cases, the 
average check sent was $1,000 or more, and more than 177,000 checks 
were sent in cases where the average check sent was at least $1,000. 
This Article expands on the growing body of scholarly literature re-
garding public enforcement of consumer laws. Although that scholarship 
has addressed the effectiveness and propriety of public enforcement, even 
raising concerns about judgment-proof defendants, there is virtually no 
substantive mention of the Civil Penalty Fund or its operations despite the 
magnitude of monetary relief it provides to consumers. This Article is the 
first empirical analysis of the Fund’s operation and the assessment and col-
lection of civil money penalties that are used by the Fund to remediate con-
sumers.  
After explaining the Fund’s operation, the Article finds that the Fund 
is an efficient way to provide significant monetary relief to consumers who 
otherwise would not receive any compensation for their losses from defend-
ants’ unlawful conduct, including through private litigation. The Fund also 
is putting money back into consumers’ pockets. In all but one of the cases, 
the defendants either charged fees expressly prohibited by law, took 
amounts that were not disclosed or owed, deceived consumers about the 
cost or material aspects of the services that they were purchasing, or some 
combination thereof. The Article finds that the structure of the Fund creates 
positive incentives for regulators to bring important cases.  
As is noted in the literature, states and other regulators also bring 
enforcement actions against similar defendants—those who cause consum-
ers monetary harm but cannot pay it back. Based on the evidence regarding 
the Civil Penalty Fund’s operation, this Article therefore recommends that 
states adopt similar consumer restitution funds. The Article details several 
issues that legislatures should consider in implementing their own funds 
and ends by providing draft language for creating and implementing such 
a fund. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Through March 31, 2019, defendants in 162 cases brought by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) were ordered to pay civil money penal-
ties.1 In 135 of those cases, the CFPB determined that after the defendants com-
plied with the orders there would be no remaining compensable, uncompensated 
harm.2 In the remaining twenty-seven cases, however, the CFPB determined that 
the defendants had caused consumers more than $671 million in harm that the 
defendants could not repay and that the consumers were not reasonably expected 
to recover from any other sources.3 But the CFPB could, and did, provide relief 
to those harmed consumers when the defendants could not. Using a little-studied 
mechanism, the Civil Penalty Fund (the “Fund”), the CFPB was able to use pen-
alties paid by defendants in all of the CFPB’s enforcement actions to compensate 
consumers for all $671 million of that harm.4 As of December 2019, the CFPB 
 
 1. Craig Cowie, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Decisions and Calculations (Sept. 3, 2020) (on 
file with author). See generally CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 18–29 (2019), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/bcfp_annual-
financial-report_fy-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/P98S-59GG]. 
 2. See discussion infra Section IV.A.2 below for a discussion regarding the definition of compensable, 
uncompensated harm. For additional details on the types and amounts of relief provided in CFPB enforcement 
actions, see, for example, Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: 
An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057, 1078 fig.2 & 1081 tbl.2 (2016) (discussing consumer relief through 
2015); Prentiss Cox, Amy Widman & Mark Totten, Strategies of Public UDAP Enforcement, 55 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 37, 70 fig.6 & tbl.5., 71 fig.7 & tbl.6, 75 tbl.9, 76 tbl.10 (2018) (discussing CFPB actions in 2014). In 
some cases, the defendants have provided redress, and in others, the CFPB determined that there was no com-
pensable harm. Compare Bank of America, N.A., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0004, 21–25 (Apr. 9, 2014) (ordering 
payment of redress estimated at more than $700 million), and CFPB Orders Bank of America to Pay $727 Million 
in Consumer Relief for Illegal Credit Card Practices, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/news-
room/cfpb-orders-bank-of-america-to-pay-727-million-in-consumer-relief-for-illegal-credit-card-practices/ 
[https://perma.cc/J44F-JWUQ], with Lighthouse Title, Inc., CFPB 2014-CFPB-0015, 7–15 (Sept. 30, 2014) (or-
dering injunctive relief and penalties but not payment of redress). See also CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 40–41 (2017), https://files.consum-
erfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4THJ-Z3D7] [hereinafter “2016 
FINANCIAL REPORT”]. 
 3. See infra Table 9. 
 4. Given the length of time between resolution of a case and the CFPB’s release of information regarding 
any payments from the Fund, unless stated otherwise, this Article examines cases resolved through March 31, 
2019. See, e.g., Civil Penalty Fund, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-
consumers/civil-penalty-fund/ (last visited May 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/UUH8-32BY]. 
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reported that checks totaling more than $447 million had been sent to consumers 
harmed in twenty of those cases.5 
Defendants in these twenty-seven cases generally did not have the financial 
resources to pay consumers for the harm the defendants had caused: they were 
bankrupt; they were banned from their respective industries or ordered to cease 
operations altogether; and in some cases, the principals were jailed.6 Yet, these 
defendants had caused a substantial amount of harm, an average of over $24.9 
million per case and a median of $10 million per case.7 Through March 31, 2019, 
the CFPB had used the Fund to send more than 905,000 checks, with an overall 
average of $494.8 In 70% of the cases, the average check sent was $1,000 or 
more; and more than 177,000 checks were sent in cases where the average check 
sent was at least $1,000.9 
As just one example, in the Student Loan Processing case, defendants ran 
an illegal student debt-relief scheme; they charged borrowers unlawful fees and 
deceived the borrowers about the costs of defendants’ services and defendants’ 
affiliations with the government.10 Based on sworn statements regarding the de-
fendants’ financial conditions, the stipulated judgment required defendants to 
cease their operations and pay $326,001 in redress and penalties, leaving an ad-
ditional $7.9 million in unremediated consumer harm.11 The CFPB used the Fund 
to give these consumers back the money that the defendants had taken illegally, 
sending 4,800 checks averaging $1,650 to harmed consumers.12 
Despite the significant amount of harm remediated by the Fund, there has 
been virtually no mention of this mechanism in the scholarly literature.13 This 
 
 5. All of these cases resolved before September 30, 2018, the end of the CFPB’s 2018 fiscal year, and as 
of February 2020, the CFPB had not published data on how much in relief it had sent to consumers for the 
remaining seven cases. See infra Table 3. 
 6. See discussion infra Section IV.C.2; see, e.g., Payments to Harmed Consumers, CFPB, https:// 
www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/ (last visited May 13, 2021) [https:// 
perma.cc/35DL-2XLN]. 
 7. See Cowie, supra note 1. 
 8. See infra Table 3. 
 9. See infra Tables 2 & 6. 
 10. Complaint at 4–12, CFPB v. IrvineWebWorks, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-01967 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2014). 
 11.  Stipulated Final Judgment and Order at 6–8 & 10, CFPB v. IrvineWebWorks, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-01967 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016). In addition, the order required defendants to set aside funds necessary to wind down 
their operations, and if any of those funds remained after the cessation, the defendants had to pay those funds as 
a penalty as well. Id. at 11. 
 12. Cowie, supra note 1. 
 13. Others have discussed the relief provided by the CFPB or the penalties imposed, but without discussing 
the use of the Civil Penalty Fund. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, CONSUMER FED’N AMERICA, DORMANT: 
THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN DECLINE 2–3 (2019), 
https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CFPB-Enforcement-in-Decline.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
RQ9G-CJPF] (discussing decreases in the number of overall cases and restitution awarded, but mentioning only 
one penalty imposed by the Bureau); Cox et al., supra note 2, at 80 (discussing relief provided in CFPB enforce-
ment actions in 2014); Peterson, supra note 2, at 1078 fig. 2 (analyzing consumer relief provided through CFPB 
enforcement actions from 2012 through 2015); Donald C. Lampe & Ryan J. Richardson, The Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau at Five: A Survey of the Bureau’s Activities, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 85, 123–24 (2017) 
(mentioning the range of civil money penalties assessed in the CFPB’s first five years and noting the penalties 
assessed in a few cases); Kelly Thompson Cochran, The CFPB at Five Years: Beyond the Numbers, 21 N.C. 
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Article is the first empirical analysis of the CFPB’s use of the Fund and con-
cludes that it is an efficient mechanism for providing real monetary relief to 
harmed consumers. Ninety-five percent of the amount allocated from the Fund 
has been allocated for remediating consumer harm, and only 1% has been set 
aside for administrative costs.14 As a result, the Article recommends that states 
adopt similar consumer restitution funds.  
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II lays out the basic history of the 
Fund and explains its operation. Part III summarizes the results of an empirical 
analysis of the CFPB’s use of the Fund, including assessing the amounts allo-
cated and actually distributed to consumers, as well as the success of those dis-
tributions. Part IV explores the benefits and costs of the Fund’s operation, finding 
that the Fund is providing consumers with significant relief—generally by re-
turning money that defendants had taken unlawfully—and that, absent the Fund, 
these consumers likely would receive little to no relief from other sources. Part 
IV concludes that the CFPB has operated the Fund with minimal overhead costs. 
Finally, Part V argues that states with a variety of different enforcement strate-
gies could operate similar funds successfully and that the existence of a fund 
creates incentives to bring important cases while undermining or eliminating 
possible undesirable incentives. 
II. IN RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, CONGRESS CREATED A CIVIL 
PENALTY FUND THAT ALLOWED THE CFPB TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION TO 
HARMED CONSUMERS EVEN IF THE DEFENDANTS WHO HARMED THEM COULD 
NOT 
A. Congress Created the CFPB to Ensure Consistent Enforcement of 
Consumer Laws 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act15 as “a direct and comprehensive re-
sponse to the financial crisis that nearly crippled the U.S. economy beginning in 
2008” and to fix “the failure of the federal banking and other regulators to ad-
dress significant consumer protection issues.”16 The Dodd-Frank Act, and in par-
ticular Title X of the Act (the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010),17 
created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,18 more commonly known 
 
BANKING INST. 55, 59 (2017) (noting that the CFPB had assessed “more than half a billion dollars” in civil money 
penalties, including a $100 million CMP against Wells Fargo). 
 14. The remainder has been allocated for consumer education and financial literacy programs. Civil Pen-
alty Fund, supra note 4. 
 15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
 16. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2, 9 (2010). 
 17. Dodd-Frank, supra note 15, § 1001. 
 18. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). 
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as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau19 or the CFPB.20 Congress charged 
the CFPB with regulating the “offering and provision of consumer financial 
products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws”21 and protecting 
consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices.22 Congress gave the 
CFPB numerous powers to effectuate its charge and objectives, including, inter 
alia, the power to issue regulations23 and to supervise specified financial institu-
tions.24 
One of the CFPB’s “primary functions . . . [is] taking appropriate enforce-
ment action to address violations of Federal consumer financial law.”25 In so 
doing, the CFPB can seek a wide variety of remedies, including monetary relief, 
injunctive relief, and civil money penalties.26 In particular, Congress expressly 
authorized the CFPB to seek relief that would provide money directly to con-
sumers harmed by the defendants27 in any given case.28 Recognizing that not 
every defendant would be able to remediate consumers for the harm he, she, or 




 19. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank, supra note 15, § 336(a)(1)–(3), § 1091, § 1100G(a) (referring to the “Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau”). 
 20. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, 1 at 11 (2010) (“This legislation creates the Bureau of Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection (CFPB), a new, streamlined independent consumer entity housed within the Federal Reserve 
System.”). 
 21. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). 
 22. Id. § 5511(b)(2).  
 23. Id. §§ 5513(b), 5531(b). 
 24. Id. § 5511(c)(4). See generally Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An In-
troduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 343–62 (2013) (discussing CFPB’s authorities); Peterson, supra 
note 2, at 1064–73 (explaining the same). 
 25. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5511(c)(4), 5481(14) (defining federal consumer financial law). The CFPB may file ac-
tions in federal court, 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a), (f), or file an administrative adjudication proceeding before its Office 
of Administrative Adjudication, § 5563(a). See generally 12 C.F.R. § 1081 (2019) (Rules of Practice for Adju-
dication Proceedings).  
 26. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2). The CFPB can seek the same relief in either federal court or an administrative 
adjudication proceeding. § 5565(a)(1). 
 27. When the CFPB files an action against a person in federal court, that person is referred to as a defend-
ant; when the CFPB files an action against a person in an adjudication proceeding, that person is referred to as a 
respondent. This Article refers to both groups as “defendants,” as that is the term used in the Civil Penalty Fund 
Rule. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.101 (2013) (defining “Bureau enforcement actions” as “any judicial or administrative 
action or proceeding” and “defendant” as “a party in a Bureau enforcement action that is found or alleged to have 
committed a violation”). 
 28. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2)(B) (“refund of moneys or return of real property”), (a)(2)(C) (“restitution”), 
(a)(2)(E) (“payment of damages or other monetary relief”); cf. § 5565(a)(2)(A) (“rescission or reformation of 
contracts”). 
 29. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(1) (“There is established in the Federal Reserve a separate fund, to be known as 
the ‘Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund’ (referred to in this section as the ‘Civil Penalty Fund’).”). 
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B. The Civil Penalty Fund Uses Penalties Imposed for Violations of 
Consumer Laws To Compensate Consumers Harmed by Those Violations Who 
Otherwise Would Not Receive Redress 
Penalties for unlawful conduct are an important enforcement tool, both to 
punish wrongdoers for violating the law and to deter others from violating the 
laws in similar ways. Numerous government enforcers have the power to impose 
civil money penalties for violations of the law.30 In most cases, these penalties 
are paid into a general fund or are used by the enforcer to fund its own opera-
tions.31 
In creating the CFPB, Congress also authorized the imposition of penalties, 
providing that “[a]ny person that violates, through any act or omission, any pro-
vision of Federal consumer financial law shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty.”32 
Congress established different limits based on the defendant’s actions and man-
dated consideration of a number of factors in imposing any penalty, including 
the defendant’s financial resources and good faith, the gravity of the violations, 
the severity of harm to the consumer, and the history of prior violations.33 The 
CFPB has used its authority to penalize wrongdoers, including, for example, im-
posing a $20 million penalty on Bank of America for illegal conduct that caused 
more than $725 million in harm to 1.9 million consumers,34 imposing a $100 
million penalty on Equifax for harming 147 million people,35 and—after having 
prosecuted Wells Fargo three previous times for consumer law violations—im-
posing a $1 billion penalty in a fourth case, although Wells Fargo received credit 
for the $500 million penalty the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency im-
posed for related conduct.36 
Rather than paying penalties like these to the U.S. Treasury, however, Con-
gress mandated that all penalties collected by the CFPB must go into the Civil 
 
 30. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 350-d (McKinney 2019) (allowing civil penalties for violations of 
specified consumer laws); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-142 (2019) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2522(b) 
(West 2019) (same); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1531(A) (2019) (same); 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1) (allowing the 
Federal Trade Commission to seek civil penalties for violations of consumer laws in specified circumstances). 
 31. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2527 (West 2019) (mandating payment of penalties into a fund for 
payment of operational expenses related to enforcing consumer laws); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-143 (2019) 
(requiring payment of penalties into either the general fund or a special revenue account for defraying certain 
expenses). 
 32. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(1). 
 33. Id. § 5565(c)(2), (3) (setting different maximum penalties when the defendant recklessly or knowingly 
violates Federal consumer financial law). 
 34. Press Release, Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, CFPB Orders Bank of America to Pay $727 
Million in Consumer Relief for Illegal Credit Card Practices (Apr. 09, 2014), https://www.consumerfinance. 
gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-bank-of-america-to-pay-727-million-in-consumer-relief-for-illegal-credit-
card-practices/ [https://perma.cc/J44F-JWUQ]. 
 35. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 3, 49, 60, CFPB v. Equifax, Inc., 
No. 1:19-cv-3300-TWT (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2019) (imposing a $100 million penalty and $425 million judgment 
for unlawfully failing to take basic steps to protect the data of 147 million consumers whose information was 
exposed in a data breach). 
 36. Consent Order at 5–6, 10, 23–24, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0001 (Apr. 20, 
2018) (finding that Wells Fargo charged consumers for mortgage interest-rate-lock extensions when it should not 
have and illegally forced consumers to pay for auto insurance they did not need or request). 
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Penalty Fund37 to be used in the first instance to pay people harmed by the de-
fendants in CFPB enforcement actions.38 Only if victims cannot be found or pay-
ments are not practicable, may the CFPB use the Fund for “the purpose of con-
sumer education and financial literacy programs.”39 
The CFPB has used the vast majority of its payments from the Fund to 
provide monetary relief to consumers who were harmed by defendants that did 
not have the resources to pay back those consumers for the harm the defendants 
caused.40 Through November 2019,41 the CFPB has allocated more than $671 
million from the Fund to remediate consumers harmed by the defendants in 
CFPB enforcement actions, and $28.8 million for consumer education and finan-
cial literacy programs.42 
Both the Dodd-Frank Act43 and the Civil Penalty Fund Rule44 impose cer-
tain conditions on the use of the Fund. First, as is noted above, the CFPB must 
use available funds to provide relief to consumers first, and only if that is not 
practicable may the CFPB use the funds for educational purposes.45 Second, con-
sumers are only eligible to receive payments from the Fund if a final order46 
 
 37. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(1) (“If the Bureau obtains a civil penalty against any person in any judicial or 
administrative action under Federal consumer financial laws, the Bureau shall deposit into the Civil Penalty Fund, 
the amount of the penalty collected.” (emphasis added)). If the CFPB or a court imposes a penalty, but the de-
fendant does not pay it, no money from that penalty will go into the Fund (although consumers harmed by that 
defendant can receive payments from the Fund if the other requirements are met).  
 38. Id. § 5497(d)(2) (“Amounts in the Civil Penalty Fund shall be available to the Bureau, without fiscal 
year limitation, for payments to the victims of activities for which civil penalties have been imposed under the 
Federal consumer financial laws.”). 
 39. Id. (“To the extent that such victims cannot be located or such payments are otherwise not practicable, 
the Bureau may use such funds for the purpose of consumer education and financial literacy programs.”); 12 
C.F.R. § 1075.107(a) (2013) (allowing allocation for educational purposes only if funds “remain after the Fund 
Administrator allocates funds as described in §1075.106(a)”); § 1075.106(a) (requiring that if there are sufficient 
funds in the Fund, “the Fund Administrator will allocate to each class of victims the amount necessary to com-
pensate fully the uncompensated harm . . . [to] all victims in that class to whom it is practicable to make pay-
ments . . . .” (emphasis added)). Because §1075.107(a) allows allocation for educational purposes only if funds 
remain after the allocation of funds under § 1075.106(a), which requires complete remediation of all harm to all 
eligible victims, funds may be allocated for educational purposes only after there is no remaining compensable, 
uncompensated harm. See also 12 C.F.R. § 1075.106(d)(2) (preventing the Fund Administrator from allocating 
funds for educational purposes that she did not allocate to eligible victims with compensable, uncompensated 
harm through the use of her discretion under section 1075.106(d)(1)). If there are not sufficient funds necessary 
to compensate fully all uncompensated harm, the allocation occurs pursuant to section 1075.106(b), and section 
1075.107(a) does not apply. 
 40. See discussion infra Section IV.C. In many cases, the defendants could pay some amount, but could 
not cover all of the harm they caused. Infra Section IV.C. In one case (Amerisave), the defendant paid more in 
redress and penalties than the harm it caused, and the CFPB used the Fund to remediate some of the harm caused. 
See discussion infra notes 195, 197. 
 41. The CFPB allocates funds in May and November each year. 
 42. Cowie, supra note 1. 
 43. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2). 
 44. On May 7, 2013, the CFPB issued a final rule to implement Section 1017(d)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2), that made the Fund created in Section 1017(d)(1) available to remediate victims when 
certain conditions are met. Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund, 78 Fed. Reg. 26,489 (May 7, 2013) (codified 
at 12 C.F.R. Pt. 1075) [hereinafter Civil Penalty Fund Rule]. 
 45. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 1075 (2013). 
 46. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.101 (2013) (defining “Final order”); § 1075.103 (requiring penalty be imposed by a 
“final order”). 
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imposes (1) a penalty on the defendant (2) in a Bureau enforcement action (3) for 
a violation that harmed the consumer.47 Third, as will be explained in more de-
tail, eligible consumers may receive payments only for compensable, uncompen-
sated harm, as those terms are defined in the Civil Penalty Fund Rule.48 
Every six months, the CFPB determines whether consumers in its enforce-
ment actions49 have any compensable, uncompensated harm.50 If they do, the 
CFPB must allocate any available money from the Fund to remediate that harm.51 
If there are not sufficient funds to remediate all of the harm, which has happened 
only twice,52 it allocates money to consumers harmed by conduct in the most 
recent orders first.53 In allocating funds, the CFPB may exercise discretion in 
determining that payments are impracticable or in apportioning funds among el-
igible consumers where there are not sufficient funds to remediate all harm.54 
 
 47. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.103 (2013); 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2). Bureau enforcement action is defined to include 
both actions in federal court and administrative adjudication proceedings. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.101.  
 48. See infra Section IV.A.2.  
 49. Only cases in which civil money penalties are imposed are reviewed. See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.103 (re-
quiring that consumers eligible for payments from the Fund be harmed by a violation for which a penalty was 
imposed). 
 50. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.105(b)(1)(i). The periods must be consecutive, with each new period starting the day 
after the prior period ended. Id. Pursuant to the schedule set by the CFPB, a period starts on the first day of the 
fiscal year (October 1) and the first day of the third quarter of the fiscal year (April 1). Civil Penalty Fund Allo-
cation Schedule, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-pen-
alty-fund/allocation-schedule/ [https://perma.cc/9LH2-TXBY]. The first period started July 21, 2011 and ended 
March 31, 2013. CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 25 (2013) 
[hereinafter 2013 FINANCIAL REPORT]; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1075.105(b)(1)(ii) (allowing the first period to be 
longer or shorter than six months);  § 1075.105(b)(1)(iii) (providing that the first period must start on July 21, 
2011). The administrator must allocate the funds for a given period within sixty days after the end of the period. 
12 C.F.R. § 1075.105(b)(2). 
 51. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.105(b)(2) (“The fund administrator will allocate available funds in the Civil Penalty 
Fund in accordance with §§1075.106 and 1075.107.” (emphasis added)). 
 52. 2016 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 37; CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 26 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 FINANCIAL REPORT]. 
 53. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.106(b)(1) (“If funds remain after allocating to each class of victims from that six-
month period the amount necessary to compensate fully the uncompensated harm . . . of all victims in that class 
to whom it is practicable to make payments, the Fund Administrator next will allocate funds to classes of victims 
from the preceding six-month period, and so forth until no funds remain.”). Harmed consumers who are members 
of a class of victims are from the six-month period in which they first had uncompensated harm as defined by 
the rule. §1075.106(b)(2). Generally speaking, the harm from the violations becomes “uncompensated harm” for 
purposes of the rule once it becomes clear that a class will not be compensated. Id.  
 54. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.106(c). The Civil Penalty Fund Rule refers to the practicability of making payments 
in a number of provisions. Generally, the rule gives the fund administrator considerable discretion to determine 
whether payments are “practicable.” See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.109(a)(6) (providing that payments to an individual 
are impracticable when the “Fund Administrator determines that other circumstances make it unreasonable to 
make a payment to the victim.”); § 1075.109(b)(3) (providing that payments to a class are impracticable if the 
fund administrator makes the same determination about payments to the class). But the rule identifies a number 
of situations where payments will be deemed impracticable. § 1075.109(a)(1)–(5) (deeming payments to indi-
viduals impracticable, inter alia, when the payments are not redeemed in a reasonable time, the victim cannot be 
located, the payment is too small given the cost of locating the victim and making the payment, the payment is 
so small that redemption is unlikely, and the victim fails to provide information required by the distribution plan); 
§ 1075.109(b)(1)–(2) (deeming payments to a class impracticable when the aggregate amount is too small given 
the costs of locating the victims and making the payments or when payments to individuals in the class are 
impracticable); cf. Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund 
Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 342 (2015) (noting that one of the two key factors the SEC considers in 
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After funds have been allocated, the CFPB hires a vendor to send checks to con-
sumers.55 Any amounts that are not cashed by consumers are returned to the 
Fund.56 The CFPB uses the Fund itself to pay for this entire process by “setting 
aside” funds for administrative expenses.57 
III. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CFPB’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
CIVIL PENALTY FUND DEMONSTRATES THAT THE FUND PROVIDES 
SUBSTANTIAL MONETARY RELIEF TO HARMED CONSUMERS 
A. Methodology 
In compiling the data cited herein regarding the CFPB’s use of the Civil 
Penalty Fund, the author reviewed every enforcement action listed on the 
CFPB’s website,58 listed on the CFPB’s Office of Administrative Adjudication’s 
docket,59 or mentioned in the CFPB’s financial reports.60 When necessary, addi-
tional documents related to these cases were pulled from the federal court dock-
ets or the CFPB’s Office of Administrative Adjudication’s docket. The author 
also reviewed all of the CFPB’s quarterly and annual financial reports and its 
memoranda on distributions from the Fund. For cases in which the Fund was 
used to compensate consumers and case documents did not indicate the financial 
or operating status of the defendants, the author reviewed the defendants’ and 
various Secretary of State websites to determine whether the defendants contin-
ued to operate. For each case, the author coded more than 140 variables related 
to the case, including the amount of relief and penalties ordered, the types of 
harm caused, the amount collected, and any amounts allocated or distributed 
from the Fund to consumers harmed by the defendants in that case. Given the 
 
determining whether to distribute money from a fair fund to harmed investors is whether the amount available to 
pay each investor justifies the cost of the distribution). 
 55. See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.108 (allowing designation of a payments administrator). Through February 2020, 
the CFPB has reported using Epiq Systems, Inc., eleven times, Rust Consulting seven, and Analytics Solutions 
twice. The FTC also has used all three vendors, as well as others, to distribute refunds to harmed consumers. 
Cowie, supra note 1; Recent FTC Cases Resulting in Refunds, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/en-
forcement/cases-proceedings/refunds [https://perma.cc/4EEZ-HVM8].  
 56. See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.108(e), 1075.109(a)(5). 
 57. Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund, 78 Fed. Reg. 26,489, 26,496 (May 7, 2013); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1075.105(c)(3). 
 58. See Enforcement Actions, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforce-
ment/actions/ [https://perma.cc/N24P-QEZ6]. The CFPB states that it will post court documents on its website 
when it takes enforcement action. Id. But see discussion infra note 60. 
 59. Docket of the Office of Administrative Adjudication, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/admin-
istrative-adjudication-proceedings/administrative-adjudication-docket/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2021) [https:// 
perma.cc/6ASV-D9W2]. 
 60. Financial Reports, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/budget-strategy/financial-re-
ports/ [https://perma.cc/APT4-Z4YU]. Only one case mentioned in the reports did not have a webpage on the 
Bureau’s Enforcement Actions page. See Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., CFPB No. 1:13-cv-24146-JAL (Nov. 19, 
2013); Peterson, supra note 2, at 1063.The author also cross-referenced the results of these searches against other 
analyses of CFPB enforcement actions and CFPB press releases to verify that there were no additional actions. 
See Peterson, supra note 2. 
COWIE (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/13/21  9:29 PM 
1428 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
length of time between resolution of a case and the CFPB’s release of infor-
mation regarding any payments from the Fund, unless stated otherwise, this Ar-
ticle examines cases resolved through March 31, 2019 for which allocation data 
was available by February 2020. 
B. The CFPB Has Allocated Hundreds of Millions of Dollars from the Fund 
to Harmed Consumers  
Through the end of the second quarter of the CFPB’s 2019 fiscal year,61 the 
CFPB had allocated more than $671 million to compensate victims in twenty-
seven cases. This amount was sufficient to compensate all of the consumers’ 
compensable, uncompensated harm, as those terms are defined in the Civil Pen-
alty Fund Rule,62 in each of the twenty-seven cases.  
The defendants in each of these cases caused a significant amount of unre-
mediated harm, even as narrowly defined by the Civil Penalty Fund Rule. The 
average allocation per case was $24.9 million with a median of $10 million.63 As 
is clear from the table and graph below, just over 70% of the allocations are be-
tween $1 million and $25 million with a cluster of allocations (seven) between 
$1 million and $5 million.64 Further, there were six cases over $25 million, with 
two of those being over $100 million (and a third case was $94.8 million).65 Only 




 61. Although the allocation itself occurred on May 29, 2019, the allocation covered all cases that became 
final, within the meaning of the Civil Penalty Fund Rule by the end of the second quarter of the 2019 fiscal year, 
Mar. 31, 2019. ELIZABETH REILLY, CFPB, CFO UPDATE FOR THE THIRD QUARTER OF FISCAL YEAR 2019 8–9 
(2019), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_cfo-update_report_fy-2019_q3.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/JDJ7-7CSE] [hereinafter Q3 2019 CFO REPORT]. 
 62. Civil Penalty Fund Rule, supra note 44, at 26489; 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104(b)–(c). 
 63. See Cowie, supra note 1. 
 64. See infra Graph 1. 
 65. See infra Table 1. 
 66. See infra Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 
Amount Allocated Number of Cases 
$100mm or more 2 
$50mm to $100mm 2 
$25mm to $50mm 2 
$20mm to $25mm 3 
$15mm to $20mm 2 
$10mm to $15mm 3 
$5mm to $10mm 4 




Based on the three allocations completed as of May 29, 2019, the CFPB’s 
practices with respect to allocation do not appear to have changed significantly 
under a new administration.67 Given that the tenth allocation occurred just days 
after Director Cordray’s resignation,68 this Article compares the first ten alloca-
tions with the three allocations under Director Kraninger or Acting Director Mul-
vaney. Because there have been only five cases69 with compensable, uncompen-
sated harm in the eleventh through thirteenth allocations, comparing the means 
and medians is of somewhat limited utility. Nonetheless, the average allocation 
in periods eleven through thirteen is $24 million,70 which is fairly close to the 
 
 67. See 2018 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 28. As is noted supra in note 61, the allocation for all 
cases with final orders as of March 31, 2019, occurred on May 29, 2019. 
 68. Richard Cordray resigned effective November 24, 2017, and President Trump appointed Mick Mul-
vaney as acting director that same day. Kevin McCoy, Richard Cordray Resigns as Director of Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau, USA TODAY (Nov. 24, 2017, 4:48 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/ 
2017/11/24/richard-cordray-resigns-director-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/893489001/ [https://perma. 
cc/4ZSH-T8YT].  Mulvaney’s appointment was effective the next day, November 25, 2017. Alan S. Kaplinsky, 
How Long Can Mick Mulvaney Serve as CFPB Acting Director?, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/02/27/how-long-can-mick-mulvaney-serve-as-cfpb-acting-di-
rector/ [https://perma.cc/JFZ2-TWKQ]. The tenth allocation happened on November 29, 2017, which is roughly 
the same amount of time after the close of the fiscal year as all other allocations governing the latter half of a 
fiscal year. 2018 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 25. President Trump later nominated Kathleen Kraninger 
as the director, and she became director effective December 11, 2018, after the Senate confirmed her. Alan S. 
Kaplinsky, Kathy Kraninger’s First Day as Director of the BCFP, CONSUMER FINANCE MONITOR (Dec. 
11, 2018), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/12/11/kathy-kraningers-first-day-as-director-of-the-
bcfp/ [https://perma.cc/K7DG-4DHQ].  
 69. In addition, there were two cases that received a second allocation in period eleven. 2018 FINANCIAL 
REPORT, supra note 52, at 29. The second allocations were roughly half the first allocations, which occurred in 
period ten. Id.  
 70. This average is to assess whether there has been a change in the determination of the total harm, as 
reflected by the allocation. Because two of the allocations in period eleven were only partial allocations to com-
plete the allocation amounts determined in period ten, they are excluded from the average for period eleven and 
are included in the average for period ten. See id. If they were included in period eleven, the average for periods 
eleven through thirteen would be $19.3 million, and the average for periods one through ten would be $24.4 
million. 
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average of $25.1 million for periods one through ten.71 In addition, it is worth 
noting that of those five allocations, one was the CFPB’s fourth largest alloca-
tion, $69.6 million, and another was $35.2 million.72 Further, the number of cases 
that received allocations in a given period does not seem to have changed signif-
icantly. The average and median number of allocations per period overall are 
two, and those numbers are the same for periods one through ten and periods 
eleven through thirteen.73 
C. The CFPB Has Distributed More than $400 Million to Consumers 
Through the Civil Penalty Fund 
Of the twenty-seven cases for which it has allocated funds, the CFPB has 
published final data on its distributions of those funds for fifteen cases and initial 
data on another five.74 In the twenty cases for which there is data,75 the CFPB 
has distributed more than 905,000 checks totaling almost $447.5 million76 to 
 
 71. Cowie, supra note 1. 
 72. Q3 2019 CFO REPORT, supra note 61, at 6–9. 
 73. Because some cases had multiple final orders in different periods (i.e., orders resolving the claims 
against different sets of defendants), each of which could allow allocations, for purposes of calculating the aver-
age number of cases with allocations in each period, this Article considered the allocation for a given case to 
have happened in the period in which the first order became final when there were multiple final orders. There 
were no cases with compensable harm in period eleven, and there also were no cases in period eight because the 
two cases with final orders with compensable harm in period eight had final orders in prior periods. See 2018 
FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 28; CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
BUREAU: FISCAL YEAR 2017 35 (2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-re-
port_fy17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4THJ-Z3D7 ] [hereinafter “2017 FINANCIAL REPORT”].  
 74. One of these five has been completed, but the CFPB had not published the final distribution data as of 
the writing of this Article. 
 75. For purposes of analyzing the amounts distributed, this Article combines the final data and the initial 
data on the distributions. The CFPB publishes data on its distributions from the Civil Penalty Fund only in its 
annual fiscal year reports. Historically, there has been very little change between the CFPB’s initial reporting and 
its final reporting on distributions. There have been twelve instances for which the CFPB has reported both initial 
and final data on distributions. In eleven of those twelve, no additional money was distributed between the re-
ports, and in the twelfth, the additional funds distributed represented only a 7.89% increase over the initial report. 
Similarly, in seven of the twelve cases, no additional checks were sent between the initial and final reports, and 
only forty-two additional checks were sent in total in the remaining five cases, which represented an increase of 
only 0.01%. 
 76. In most cases the amount distributed is very close to the amount allocated. In fourteen of the twenty 
cases (70%), the amount distributed was at least 95% of the amount allocated, and in a fifteenth case the amount 
distributed was 94% of the amount allocated. In four of the cases, however, the amount distributed was at least 
$1 million less than the amount allocated, and all told, the CFPB allocated $480.2 million to consumers harmed 
in the twenty cases, and sent checks to consumers totaling 93% of that amount, or $447.5 million, meaning that 
$32.8 million was allocated but not distributed. In at least some cases, this difference is the result of overestimat-
ing the harm during the allocation process. See 2017 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 35 n.8 (noting that 
the initial harm in the Morgan Drexen matter was overstated by $500,000). In others, it may be that the CFPB 
could not identify harmed consumers with enough specificity to provide reimbursement. See 2018 Financial Re-
port, supra note 52, at 30 (noting that $15 million was unallocated from the Morgan Drexen matter “upon further 
assessment of available victim data and funding needs”). The $17.6 million difference in the Morgan Drexen 
matter alone accounted more than half of the total difference between the amounts initially allocated and the 
amounts ultimately distributed. 
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consumers harmed by the unlawful actions of the defendants in CFPB enforce-
ment actions.77 
As the average check amounts78 in the tables below demonstrate, payments 
from the Fund are not insubstantial.79 They represent significant losses for con-
sumers. The mean of the average check amounts for all of the cases is $2,329 
and the median is $1,322.80 In other words, in more than half of the cases, the 
average check amount was $1,322 or greater.81 Just over two thirds of the cases 
(fourteen of twenty or 70%) have average check amounts of $1,000 or more, and 
more than 177,000 checks82—totaling $391.8 million—were sent to consumers 
harmed in these cases.   
There is considerable variation among the average check amounts in each 
case. Slightly more than half of the cases (twelve of twenty or 60%) have average 
check amounts between $1,000 and $5,000 (inclusive), with the averages in a 
cluster of cases (eight of the twenty or 40%) falling between $1,000 and $2,000 
(inclusive).83 Only six cases had averages below $1,000, and they respectively 
had averages of $891, $391, $210, $93, $41, and $27.84 Thus, even the cases with 
 
 77. The figures in this section include only the amounts distributed through the Civil Penalty Fund. In a 
number of cases, the CFPB also provided Bureau-administered redress to the same consumers. Although the 
money is going to the same consumers, it is coming from different sources, and likely in separate checks, in the 
two instances. In some cases, a defendant pays some amount of redress to the CFPB as well as paying a civil 
money penalty. In those cases, the amounts paid as redress are sent to consumers as Bureau-administered redress, 
and any remaining compensable, uncompensated harm is paid through the Civil Penalty Fund. See, e.g., 2017 
FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 41, 44 (reporting that approximately $3 million was distributed from the 
Civil Penalty Fund to consumers harmed in the 3D Resorts-Bluegrass matter and approximately $100,000 in 
Bureau-administered redress). Compare 2017 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 43–44 nn.13–14, 16 (noting 
cases in which a single class of victims was compensated through both the Civil Penalty Fund and Bureau-
administered redress) with 2017 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 44 n.15 (noting a case in which there were 
two classes of harmed consumers, one of which was compensated through the Civil Penalty Fund and another 
that was compensated through Bureau-administered redress). 
 78. By dividing the amount distributed by the number of checks sent, one can derive an average check 
amount for a given case or for all of the cases combined. To the extent that the CFPB sent multiple checks to 
some individuals (e.g., to replace the original checks sent to those individuals or to send additional monies to a 
given individual) and has included those additional checks in its reports of the total number of checks sent, the 
average check amount herein will be a conservative estimate of the average amount actually sent to consumers. 
Any check reissues will artificially lower the average amount actually sent. For example, if two consumers each 
received $100 from the fund, but one consumer needed the check to be reissued, there would be 3 checks sent, 
resulting in an average of $67 rather than the true average of $100. See discussion infra Section III.C. and notes 
90–91. 
 79. See infra Table 2. 
 80. See Cowie, supra note 1. 
 81. If one divides the overall amount distributed by the total number of checks sent, the average check 
amount overall is $494. This average, however, masks both the fact that almost 75% of the cases have averages 
higher than this amount and the fact that 80% of the checks sent were sent in cases with average check amounts 
below this amount.  
 82. The CFPB publishes only the number of checks sent, not the number of consumers who received or 
cashed the checks. The CFPB appears to have sent multiple checks to at least some individual consumers. See 
discussion supra note 78; see also discussion infra Section III.C. and notes 90–91. 
 83. See infra Table 2. 
 84. The smallest average ($27) was in Amerisave Mortg. Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0010 (Aug. 12, 
2014). The Amerisave matter is unusual. Amerisave paid approximately $20.9 million to the CFPB as part of its 
consent order with the CFPB, roughly $14.9 million in redress and another $6 million in civil money penalties. 
Id. at 27, 29; 2016 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 37–38, 46, 50. The CFPB sent harmed consumers 50,061 
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smaller averages still had average amounts that likely would be significant to 
consumers.85 
TABLE 2: AVERAGE CHECK AMOUNTS BY CASE 
Average Check Amount 
Number of 
Cases 










$10,000  1 $9,000 $10,000 0 
$1,000 $10,000 13 $8,000 $9,000 0 
$100 $1,000 3 $7,000 $8,000 1 
$75 $100 1 $6,000 $7,000 0 
$50 $75 0 $5,000 $6,000 0 
$25 $50 2 $4,000 $5,000 1 
$0 $25 0 $3,000 $4,000 1 
   $2,000 $3,000 2 
   $1,000 $2,000 8 
 Total 20  Total 13 
Furthermore, as the tables below demonstrate, the vast majority (88%) of 
money distributed from the Fund has gone to consumers harmed in cases where 
the average check amount is at least $1,000.86 If one considers the checks sent in 
cases where the average check amount was at least $100, the number of checks 
sent increases to almost 292,000,87 and those checks total almost $418 million, 
accounting for 93% of the total amount distributed.88 
The below tables group the checks sent in each case based on the average 
check amount for that case. Each row represents a range of average check amount 
values. For each range, the table shows how many checks were sent in the cases 
with average check amounts within the range and the total value of those checks. 
For each range, the table also shows the percentage of the total number of checks 
sent and the percentage of the total value of all checks sent that were sent in cases 
where the average check amount fell within the specified range.  
 
checks totaling $1,366,268 from the Fund, and sent another 96,780 checks averaging $150 to pay the redress to 
consumers. It is the only case in which funds were allocated from the Civil Penalty Fund and the defendants paid 
more to the CFPB in total than the amount of harm they caused to consumers. Indeed, it is the only case in which 
the Fund was used wherein the amounts actually paid by the defendants to the CFPB exceeded the amount of 
compensable, uncompensated harm. See also discussion infra notes 195, 197, 217. 
 85. See discussion infra Section III.D (noting that even the two cases with the lowest averages still had 
rates of cashing of 63% and the others had higher rates); Section IV.B (noting comparisons with consumer returns 
in other types of actions). 
 86. See infra Table 3. 
 87. 291,928 to be exact. See infra Table 6. 
 88. See infra Table 3. 
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TABLE 3: CHECKS MAILED IN CASES WITH AVERAGE CHECK AMOUNTS IN 
SPECIFIED RANGES 
Range of the Average 






of the Total 




Sent in Each 
Range 
Total Value of 
All Checks Sent 













$10,000          239  0% $2,983,646  1% 
$5,000 $10,000      1,331  0% $10,599,805  2% 
$1,000 $5,000 175,495 19% $378,258,621  85% 
$100 $1,000  114,863  13%  $26,136,444  6% 
$75 $100    99,338  11% $9,243,731  2% 
$50 $75              -    - -    - 
$25 $50  513,806  57%  $20,268,714  5% 
$0 $25 - - - - 
 Total 905,072  $447,490,961  
 
TABLE 4 























of All Checks 



















$4,000  $5,000      1    20,485  2% $90,212,602  20% 
$3,000  $4,000  1     5,394  1% $18,331,734  4% 
$2,000  $3,000  2      4,320  0% $11,385,587  3% 
$1,000  $2,000  8  145,296  16% $258,328,698  58% 
 Total 12  175,495  19% $378,258,621  85% 
 
Because the CFPB does not publish information on the number of consum-
ers who have received checks or the amounts that any individual consumers re-
ceived, it is not possible to state exactly how many consumers received distribu-
tions from the Civil Penalty Fund. Given that the CFPB already has sent more 
than 905,000 checks to consumers, however, the number of consumers receiving 
checks seems likely to be in the hundreds of thousands.89 It appears that at least 
in some cases, the CFPB has re-sent checks to given individuals. There were 
three cases in which additional checks were sent after the initial report on the 
 
 89. See supra Table 3. 
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distributions, but the amount distributed did not increase.90 In addition, numer-
ous CFPB memos on the distributions refer to re-issuing checks, suggesting that 
at least some checks were reissued.91 Even if every consumer received two 
checks, which seems extremely unlikely, it would mean more than 450,000 con-
sumers received checks. 
Nonetheless, what can be shown from the data is that the CFPB distributed 
most of the money (85%) in the 175,495 checks totaling $378.3 million that were 
sent to consumers harmed in cases where the average check amount was between 
$1,000 and $5,000 and that 145,296 of those checks, totaling $258.3 million, 
were sent to consumers harmed in the cluster of cases where the average check 
amount was between $1,000 and $2,000.92 
Relatively few checks (just over 1,500) were sent in the two cases where 
the average check amount was greater than $5,000, and those two cases had un-
usual characteristics that caused large amounts of harm per consumer.93 Only 
239 checks were sent in the 3D Resorts-Bluegrass matter—a matter involving 
the sale of real property and violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclo-
sure Act94—where the average check amount was more than $12,000.95 The Bu-
reau also sent 1,331 checks in the Hoffman Law Group matter, where the average 
check amount was $7,964. In that case, the court found that the defendants 
charged very high, unlawful initial fees (typically $6,000) as well as other un-
lawful fees.96 
In addition, a relatively small portion (5%) of the total amount distributed 
was sent to consumers harmed in the two cases with the lowest averages, $41 in 
Union Workers Credit Service97 and $27 in Amerisave.98 Although the CFPB 
sent $20.3 million to the consumers in these two cases, it also sent more than 
510,000 checks, resulting in relatively low average check amounts in each case. 
Most of these checks (463,745) were sent in the Union Workers Credit Service 
 
 90. Compare 2016 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 46–47 (initial report on distributions for (Gordon 
and National Corrective Group), and 2017 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 40 (initial report on distribution 
for Hoffman Law Group), with 2017 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 41 (final report on distribution for 
National Corrective Group), and 2018 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 29–30 (final report on distributions 
for Gordon and Hoffman Law Group). 
 91. See, e.g., CFPB, In the Matter of Student Aid Institute, Inc—File No. 2016-CFPB-0008, https://files. 
consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_Student-Aid-Institute.pdf (last visited May 13, 2021) [https://perma. 
cc/E93F-2F3M] (“This matter is now closed. Payments and check reissue requests are no longer being hon-
ored.”).  
 92. See supra Table 4. 
 93. See supra Table 3. 
 94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1720. 
 95. 3D Resorts-Bluegrass, LLC, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0002, 3–6, 11 (Dec. 3, 2013) (finding that defend-
ants materially misrepresented the value of property sold as part of a resort); see also discussion infra note 125. 
 96. Default Judgment and Order as to Corporate Defendants at 6, CFPB v. Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 
(S.D. Fla. May 28, 2015) [hereinafter Hoffman Law Group matter]. 
 97. See generally Stipulated Final Judgment, CFPB v. Union Workers Credit Servs., No. 3:14-cv-04410 
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2015). 
 98. See generally Amerisave Mortg. Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0010 (Aug. 12, 2014). 
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case.99 That case was a relatively straightforward fraud where the defendants 
allegedly lied to consumers by falsely telling them they would receive a general-
purpose credit card (similar to a MasterCard or Visa) if they paid a membership 
fee (either $37 or $95), but the defendants took the relatively small membership 
fee from hundreds of thousands of consumers.100 As is discussed below, the Am-
erisave matter also was unusual in that the defendants caused much more harm 
than the $1.4 million paid from the Civil Penalty Fund, but the defendants paid 
for most of the remediation of harm through Bureau-administered redress.101 
Because the CFPB sent so many checks in these two cases with relatively 
low average amounts, these checks pull the overall average check amount—de-
termined simply by dividing the total amount distributed by the total number of 
checks sent—down to $494. If the checks sent in these two cases are excluded 
from the totals, the overall average increases to $1,092—in the range with the 
cluster of eight cases that accounted for 58% of the total amount distributed. 
D. Consumers Have Cashed 87% of the Amounts Distributed and That 
Percentage Is Likely To Increase 
The CFPB’s distributions are very effective at getting money back into con-
sumers’ pockets to compensate them for money taken illegally by defendants. 
The published data102 indicate that consumers actually cash an extremely high 
percentage of the funds distributed. In just over half of the cases, consumers 
cashed 90% or more of the funds distributed, and overall, consumers cashed 
87%—$192.4 million—of the $220.7 million distributed in these fifteen 
cases.103 And the two lowest cashing rates are still 63%.104 
  
 
 99. CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU – FISCAL YEAR 2016, 
at 46 (2016), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/112016_cfpb_Final_Financial_Report_FY_ 
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V7B-47LK]. 
 100. Complaint at 3, Union Workers Credit Servs., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-04410. 
 101. See discussion infra notes 195, 197; see also discussion supra notes 84, 85.  
 102. Although the CFPB has completed sixteen distributions, it has published data on the percentage of 
funds distributed that were cashed (the “rate of cashing”) only for fifteen of the cases as of the writing of this 
Article. See generally 2018 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 52. 
 103. See infra Tables 5, 9. 
 104. See infra Table 5, Graph 2. 
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TABLE 5 
Matter Name Average Check Amount 
Percentage of Dis-
tribution Cashed 
3D Resorts-Bluegrass, LLC  $ 12,483.87  97% 
Hoffman Law Group  $   7,963.79  95% 
National Legal Help Center  $   2,657.40  93% 
Gordon  $   2,632.50  91% 
Global Client Solutions, LLC $   1,804.81 92% 
IrvineWebWorks Inc. $   1,650.73 96% 
American Debt Settlement Solutions  $   1,472.70  97% 
Meracord LLC  $   1,166.44  90% 
Colfax Capital Corp.  $   1,104.38  71% 
Student Aid Institute, Inc. $   1,073.39 85% 
Payday Loan Debt Solution, Inc.  $      390.57  86% 
National Corrective Group, Inc.  $      209.59  79% 
Student Financial Aid Services  $        93.05  79% 
Union Workers Credit Services, Inc.  $        40.76  63% 




Furthermore, as the tables above demonstrate, the rate of cashing tends to 
increase as the average check amount increases.105 Therefore, the overall rate of 
 
 105. See supra Table 5. The FTC also has noted a statistically relevant relationship between check cashing 
rates and median check amounts. FTC, CONSUMERS AND CLASS ACTIONS: A RETROSPECTIVE AND ANALYSIS OF 
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cashing is likely to increase for two reasons. First, of the five remaining cases 
where the distributions are complete but the rates of cashing have not been pub-
lished, four have average check amounts above $1,000—which have typically 
had rates of cashing at 90% or higher106—and the fifth has an average check 
amount of $891.107 Second, in those remaining five cases, the CFPB sent $226.7 
million in checks to consumers, more than the total distributed in the fifteen pub-
lished cases.108 Assuming that those cases have rates of cashing comparable to 
the rates of published cases with similar average check amounts, one would ex-
pect the overall rate of cashing to rise to 90% or higher once the data on those 
five cases is published. 
IV. THE FUND EFFICIENTLY PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT REDRESS TO CONSUMERS 
WHO LOST MONEY AND OTHERWISE WOULD RECEIVE LITTLE TO NO RELIEF 
A. The CFPB Uses the Fund To Repay Consumers Money That Defendants 
Took From Them Unlawfully 
1. The Fund Is Used To Return Unlawful Fees to Consumers  
The CFPB has used the Fund primarily to return fees that defendants took 
from consumers illegally. These fees break down into roughly two categories: 
(1) fees that were by themselves unlawful or (2) fees for goods or services where 
the defendants deceived the consumers as to either the cost or the goods and 
services that would be provided. All but one of the cases where the CFPB allo-
cated funds to consumers fell into one of these two categories.109 In most cases, 
the defendants both collected unlawful fees and deceived consumers about the 
cost or the services that would be provided.110 
 
SETTLEMENT CAMPAIGNS 12 (2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumers-class-ac-
tions-retrospective-analysis-settlement-campaigns/class_action_fairness_report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X46E-
Z6JM] [hereinafter “2019 FTC CLASS ACTION REPORT”]. 
 106. See supra Table 5. Eight of the ten cases with average check amounts above $1,000 had a cashing rate 
of 90% or higher. The two exceptions are Colfax Capital, in which the rate was only 71%, and Student Aid 
Institute, with 85%. The four remaining cases with average check amounts above $1,000 have average check 
amounts of $4,403.84, $3,398.54, $1,945.04, and $1,171.02. 
 107. See Cowie, supra note 1. 
 108. Of the five cases for which cashing rates had not been published as of the writing of this Article, the 
four cases where the average check amount is above $1,000 represented $224.3 million of the $226.7 million in 
outstanding checks. 
 109. The lone case that did not fall into one of these two categories also involved deceptive conduct: the 
defendants sent letters on government letterhead, threatened consumers that they would be sent to jail unless they 
paid their debts, and falsely stated that consumers had to enroll in defendants’ classes in order to avoid prosecu-
tion. Complaint at 6, 9–13, 17–20, 22–23, CFPB v. Nat’l Corrective Grp., No. 15-cv-00899-RDB (D. Md. Mar. 
30, 2015). These statements and threats were deceptive under both Dodd-Frank, 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B), and 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(3)–(5), 1692e(9)–(10). See id. at 17–20, 22–
23. 
 110. Defendants in nineteen of the twenty-seven cases allocated (seventy percent) did both. See infra text 
accompanying notes 120–25. 
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In more than 80% of the cases, the defendants took unlawful fees.111 Most 
of these cases involved defendants taking fees that were unlawful because the 
defendants had not yet provided the services as required by law.112 So-called 
advance fees are illegal in a number of contexts, including, inter alia, debt-relief 
and credit-repair services sold through telemarketing.113 Collecting these fees 
before providing the services is illegal because these companies often promised 
results, collected fees, and then failed to deliver the services or achieve the prom-
ised results.114 Seventy percent of the cases that received allocations (nineteen 
of the twenty-seven) involved unlawful advance fees, primarily in debt-relief 
cases.115 Another three cases (11% of the total cases that have received alloca-
tions) involved defendants charging consumers more than either the defendants 
had disclosed or more than the consumers owed.116 
In these cases, by law, defendants simply were not allowed to collect these 
fees.117 Returning the money to consumers directly corrects the harms caused by 
the defendants’ unlawful acts. Some might argue that these consumers are re-
ceiving windfalls because they received some services. This argument, however, 
misses the mark. Based on a history of scams in the provision of these types of 
services, the law requires these defendants to perform the services before they 
can charge consumers, and the services had to have provided benefit to the con-
sumers.118 If the defendants ultimately did provide the services such that they 
 
 111. See Cowie, supra note 1. 
 112. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(2), (a)(5)(i) (2020)  (prohibiting advance fees for debt-relief and credit-
repair services sold through telemarketing). 
 113. § 310.4(a)(4). 
 114. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458, 48,463 (Aug. 10, 2010) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310) 
(discussing concerns with debt-relief services); Telemarketing Sales Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,842, 43,853–54 (Aug. 
23, 1995) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310) (discussing concerns with credit-repair services). 
 115. Fourteen of the nineteen cases involved unlawful advance fees for debt-relief services, in violation of 
either the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), 16 C.F.R. pt. 310, or Regulation O, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1015, which was 
formally known as the Mortgage Assistance Relief Services Rule (“MARS Rule”) and formerly codified at 16 
C.F.R. pt. 322. Nine of those fourteen cases involved defendants taking advance fees for debt-relief services in 
violation of the TSR, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5)(i). The other five cases involved defendants who violated Regula-
tion O, 12 C.F.R. § 1015.5(a), by taking advance fees for debt-relief services in the context of providing mortgage 
relief assistance services. Three of the nineteen cases involved defendants collecting advance fees for credit-
repair services in violation of the TSR, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(2). Two of the nineteen cases involved defendants 
substantially assisting others in the collection of unlawful advance fees in violation of the TSR, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 310.3(b). The nineteenth case involved a defendant charging fees prior to providing a good-faith estimate in 
violation of Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.19(a)(1)(ii), and Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.7(a)(4). All told 
thirteen of the nineteen cases involved unlawful advance fees in violation of the TSR. One case involved unlawful 
advance fees for both credit-repair and debt-relief services. 
 116. These cases primarily involved violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§  1601(1)–114, 
and/or its implementing regulation, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026. In one case, the defendants violated 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1631(b), 1638(a)(3), and 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.17(c)(1), 1026.18(d). In another, the defendants violated 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1631(a), 1638(b), 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.17(a)–(b), 1026.18, as well as the prohibitions on deceptive 
acts or practices in Dodd-Frank, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), (c)(1), (d)(2)(A), and 5536(a)(1)(B). And in the last, the 
defendants violated 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.6(b)(2) and 1026.14. 
 117. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(2), (a)(5)(i). 
 118. See, e.g., § 310.4(a)(2) (prohibiting sellers from requesting or receiving payment for credit-repair ser-
vices until, inter alia, they have provided consumers with documentation “that the promised results have been 
achieved”); § 310(a)(5)(i) (prohibiting sellers from requesting or receiving payment for “any debt relief service 
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would be entitled to collect fees, the consumers might have no—or de minimis—
compensable harm from the unlawfully early collection. Absent proof that the 
defendants ultimately complied with the law’s requirements, however, the con-
sumers owed nothing. Giving the consumers their money back is a substantial 
step toward putting the consumers back in the position the law intended.119 
Eighty-five percent of the cases (twenty-three of twenty-seven) that have 
received allocations involved defendants deceiving consumers as to either the 
cost of the services or the types of services that would be provided.120 In these 
cases, the CFPB often pleaded deception under both the Dodd-Frank Act121 as 
well as another consumer law statute.122 In eleven cases, the defendants deceived 
the consumers as to the cost of the services;123 in seventeen, as to the services 
that would be provided,124 and in five, as to both.125 
In both types of cases, defendants deceived consumers to get them to agree 
to purchase the goods or services. The correct remedy for what is, in essence, 
fraudulent inducement is to return the consumers’ money.126 Even assuming that 
consumers received goods or services with some value, “the central issue here is 
whether the seller’s misrepresentations tainted the customer’s purchasing deci-
sions.”127 In rejecting the defendant’s argument that redress for such deception 
should be reduced by the value of the goods received, the Ninth Circuit used the 
example of a consumer who was sold rhinestones that were marketed as dia-
monds.128 “We would not limit their recovery to the difference between what 
they paid and a fair price for rhinestones. The seller’s misrepresentations tainted 
the customers’ purchasing decisions.”129 Thus, the “fraud in the selling, not the 
value of the thing sold, is what entitles consumers in this case to full refunds or 
 
until and unless . . . [t]he seller or telemarketer has renegotiated, settled, reduced, or otherwise altered the terms 
of at least one debt pursuant to a . . . valid contractual agreement executed by the customer”). 
 119. Simply refunding the fees does not, of course, compensate consumers for lost time, the time value of 
the money, and other harms. 
 120. See Cowie, supra note 1. 
 121. See 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B). 
 122. E.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 14–19, CFPB v. Com. Credit Consult-
ants, No. 2:17-cv-4720 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2017) (alleging deception under the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5536, and 
under the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.3(a)(1)(iii), (a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(iii)). 
 123. E.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at 9–13, CFPB v. Student Fin. Aid Serv., Inc., No. 
2:15-at-00821 (E.D. Cal. July 23, 2015) (alleging that defendant misrepresented the total cost of its services and 
failed to disclose truthfully a negative option feature of its services). 
 124. E.g., Complaint at 3, CFPB v. Union Workers Credit Servs., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-4410 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 
17, 2014) (alleging that defendant falsely stated that consumers would get a general-use credit card—similar to 
a Visa or MasterCard—if they purchased a membership). 
 125. E.g., Notice of Charges Seeking Rescission, Restitution, Civil Money Penalties, and Other Legal and 
Equitable Relief at 10–23, In re 3D Resorts-Bluegrass, LLC, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0002 (June 14, 2013) (al-
leging that defendant misrepresented the infrastructure and services that would be provided with the properties 
for sale as well as the cost of some services). 
 126. See, e.g., McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1388-89 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming consumer redress 
equivalent to the amount of gross sales because defendant had fraudulently induced customers “to accept and pay 
for unordered” goods).  
 127. Id. at 1388. 
 128. FTC v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 606 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 129. Id. 
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to refunds for each [item] that is not useful to them.”130 A more limited remedy 
would strip away the consumers’ ability to make their own purchasing decisions 
and would force them into purchases that they would not have made but for de-
fendants’ unlawful conduct. Thus, the default position in deception cases such as 
these should be that the consumers get back all of the money they paid as a result 
of the deception.  
Moreover, in all but four of the cost-deception cases, the defendants also 
collected unlawful advance fees, deceived consumers about the services to be 
provided, or both.131 In 45% of the cost-deception cases, the defendants also 
charged unlawful advance fees.132 To the extent that all of the monies defendants 
illegally took from consumers were unlawful advance fees, consumers should 
get all of those fees back, regardless of any services that may have been provided. 
In 45%133 of the cost-deception cases, the defendants also deceived consumers 
as to the goods or services that would be provided. Again, setting aside the de-
ception as to the cost, the deception as to what would be provided vitiates the 
consumers’ purchasing decisions, and the consumers should receive all of their 
money back.  
In the remaining four cases, the CFPB has taken a conservative approach 
to defining harm.134 When consumers contracted for, and received, something of 
significant value from the defendants (for example, a loan or real property), the 
CFPB defined the harm as only undisclosed charges paid above the value of the 
goods actually received and the charges the consumers agreed to pay for those 
goods.135 In two of these cases, Triton Management and Colfax Capital, the de-
fendants charged more for loans than they had disclosed to consumers, and the 
CFPB gave consumers back any amounts they paid beyond the principal and 
agreed-upon charges.136 In the third case, Student Financial Aid Services, the 
defendants, inter alia, deceived consumers about the existence of recurring fees, 
and the CFPB used the fund to return only fees paid for periods in which the 
 
 130. Id.; see e.g., Default Judgment and Order as to Corporate Defendants at 12–13, CFPB v. Harper, No. 
9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2015) (holding defendants liable for the entire amount spent by consumers 
because of the “fraud in the selling”). 
 131. Cowie, supra note 1. 
 132. Cowie, supra note 1. 
 133. Although there is some overlap between these two groups, the fact that they both happen to account 
for 45% of the cost deception cases is a coincidence. 
 134. See e.g., Consent Order at 14, In re Colfax Capital Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0009 (July 29, 2014) 
(ordering equitable monetary relief in the amount of finance charges consumers paid above the amounts of fi-
nance charges disclosed by defendants). 
 135. See, e.g., id. 
 136. Consent Order at 12, In re Triton Mgmt. Grp., Inc., CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0005 (July 19, 2018) (or-
dering equitable monetary relief in the amount of consumer payments that exceed the finance charges disclosed 
by defendants); In re Triton Management Group, Inc., File No. 2018-BCFP-0005 CFPB, https://files.consum-
erfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_triton-management-group.pdf (last visited May 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ 
8QPT-5XK2] (stating that defendants failed to disclose finance charges and that defendants must return unlawful 
fees to consumers); Consent Order, supra note 134, at 14 (ordering equitable monetary relief in the amount of 
finance charges consumers paid above the amounts of finance charges disclosed by defendants). 
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defendants provided no services to the consumers.137 In the fourth case, Moseley, 
the CFPB had not published information as of the writing of this Article on the 
harm that will be remediated, but some consumers never authorized defendants’ 
loans, and those consumers should receive all of the finance charges they paid 
back while those consumers who agreed to loans but were deceived as to the total 
cost should receive only the finance charges they paid above the amounts that 
they reasonably expected to pay.138 
2. The Structure of the Fund Helps Ensure That Only Actual Harm Is 
Compensated  
The Civil Penalty Fund Rule (the “Rule”)139 narrowly defines140 the 
“harm” that may be remediated through the Fund in a way that reasonably pre-
vents consumers from receiving windfalls. The Fund’s framework leaves little 
space for gaming the system: an adjudicative authority either expressly orders 
redress for the consumers’ harm in an amount certain or defines the amount of 
that harm in some way, or the harm is limited to actual out-of-pocket losses 
caused by the defendants’ unlawful conduct.141 Both methods provide certainty 
as to the existence of the harm that might be remediated through the Fund. Fur-
ther, however the harm is defined, a consumer may only receive compensation 
from the Fund if the CFPB determines that the consumer is not reasonably ex-
pected to receive compensation from another source.142 As is discussed in detail 
infra in Section IV.C, in most cases in which the Fund has been used, it is ex-
 
 137. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order at 2, CFPB v. Student Fin. Aid Servs., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01581 
(Sept. 11, 2015) (defining affected consumers as those who purchased certain services and were charged in a 
given year during which they did not use defendant’s services). 
 138. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order as to Defendants Richard F. Moseley, Sr., at 4, CFPB v. Moseley, 
No. 4:14-cv-00789 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2018) (defining affected consumers as those affected by the violations 
detailed in counts I through IV of the complaint); Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 18–
21, CFPB v. Moseley, No. 4:14-cv-00789 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2014) (alleging that defendants deceived consum-
ers into believing that they authorized loans when they had not and therefore were obligated to pay the corre-
sponding finance charges, deceived consumers as to the total finance charges for the loans, unfairly debited con-
sumers’ bank accounts without authorization, and failed to disclose accurately the cost of the loans). 
 139. Civil Penalty Fund Rule, supra note 44; 12 C.F.R. pt. 1075 (2020). 
 140. Under the rule, the amount of harm is set by an order (or the method for calculating the harm is set by 
an order), or the CFPB compensates only out-of-pocket losses. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104(c). Non-monetary harm 
(e.g., stress or time spent handling the results of a violation) are not out-of-pocket losses. 
 141. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104(b)–(c). 
 142. Id. § 1075.104(b). 
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tremely unlikely that consumers could receive relief from private litigation fol-
lowing the CFPB enforcement action.143 Thus, the requirements of the Civil Pen-
alty Fund Rule make it reasonably unlikely that any consumers will receive 
windfalls from the Fund.144 
The Rule limits payments to situations in which three criteria are met: the 
consumers must be eligible victims; they must have compensable harm; and 
some amount of that harm must be uncompensated. First, consumers are eligible 
victims—who therefore may receive payments from the fund—only if they have 
been harmed by a violation for which a final order145 in a Bureau enforcement 
action146 imposes a civil penalty.147 Thus, if a final order does not require a de-
fendant148 to pay a civil money penalty, the consumers harmed by that defendant 
cannot receive payments from the fund regardless of the amount of harm they 
have suffered. 
Second, the consumers’ harm must be “compensable” under the rule.149 
The rule establishes a hierarchical framework for determining whether there is 
compensable harm.150 Court orders regarding the amount of harm control.151 If 
an order does not specify the amount of the harm, each consumer’s compensable 
harm is his or her out-of-pocket losses from the violation for which the penalty 
was imposed if those losses are practicable to determine.152 
 
 143. Although it does not appear to have happened frequently with the CFPB, when federal agencies bring 
enforcement actions while there is ongoing private litigation, they often have coordinated with the private actions 
in the provision of relief, thereby ensuring that there are no double recoveries. See, e.g., Stipulated Order for 
Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 35–41, CFPB v. Equifax, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-3300 (N.D. Ga. July 
23, 2019); Velikonja, supra note 54, at 387–88 (noting that where there are overlapping actions, the SEC “usually 
coordinates the distribution of collected funds with parallel proceedings,” for example in cases with parallel class 
actions or criminal proceedings); Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief 
at 8–14, FTC v. Airborne Health, Inc., No. 08-05300 (Aug. 13, 2008) (entering judgment against defendants for 
$30 million but coordinating the provision of relief to consumers with a private class action). 
 144. Indeed, if anything, this conservative approach often will undercompensate consumers by excluding 
harm that is hard to quantify (e.g., the value of lost time, the time-value of money, the costs of significant emo-
tional distress). 
 145. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.101 (defining “Final order” as “a consent order or settlement issued by a court or by 
the Bureau, or an appealable order issued by a court or by the Bureau as to which the time for filing an appeal 
has expired and no appeals are pending”). 
 146. Id. (defining “Bureau enforcement action” to include both administrative actions or proceedings as 
well as actions in court wherein the Bureau has “obtained relief with respect to a violation”). 
 147. § 1075.103.  
 148. The Civil Penalty Fund Rule defines “defendant” to include parties “found or alleged to have commit-
ted a violation” in both court and administrative adjudications). 12 C.F.R. § 1075.101. 
 149. § 1075.104(a)–(c) (2020) (providing that the fund will be used to compensate eligible victims’ uncom-
pensated harm, that “uncompensated harm” is equal to a victim’s compensable harm minus any payments rea-
sonably expected or received, and defining the framework for determining “compensable” harm). 
 150. See § 1075.104(c). This includes orders denying redress, setting an amount of harm for an entire class, 
or establishing a method for calculating the harm. Id. If the order suspends or waives part of the redress ordered, 
it does not alter or reduce the amount of compensable harm. § 1075.104(c)(1). 
 151. § 1075.104(c)(2)(i). 
 152. § 1075.104(c)(2)(iii). Although the CFPB does not release much data on how it calculates the harm in 
a given case (beyond what is in the relevant orders), the CFPB generally appears to be determining harm by 
looking at the defendants’ and other related entities’ records of consumers’ payments, rather than by creating a 
claims process where consumers would submit supporting documents. It has used claims processes in a few 
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Third, the fund only makes payments for the uncompensated harm of eligi-
ble consumers.153 Uncompensated harm is defined as compensable harm minus 
any compensation the consumer has received for that harm or is reasonably ex-
pected to receive for that harm.154 The rule lays out several instances in which 
the consumer will have received other compensation for the harm: previous pay-
ments from the Civil Penalty Fund to the same class of victims; redress ordered 
in a Bureau enforcement action that has not been suspended, waived, or deter-
mined to be uncollectible; and any other redress that the Bureau knows has either 
been paid or has been paid to an intermediary for distribution to victims and that 
compensates the consumer for the same harm.155 If it is unduly burdensome, 
given the amounts at stake, to determine either the amount of redress that is, or 
will be, paid by another entity or the extent to which that redress compensates 
consumers for the same harm, the Bureau may exclude that redress from the 
compensation that the victim is expected to receive.156 
B. Consumers Likely Find Payments from the Fund to Be Significant 
The CFPB’s payments from the Fund likely are significant to average con-
sumers. For context, the Federal Reserve Board surveyed approximately 12,000 
individuals in 2019.157 Nearly 37% of people surveyed stated that they would 
have difficulty covering a $400 unexpected expense.158 Further, “[n]early 3 in 
10 adults were either unable to pay their monthly bills or were one modest finan-
cial setback away from failing to pay monthly bills in full.”159 Overall, 25% of 
adults had family incomes that were less than $25,000, and 37% had family in-
comes of less than $40,000.160 Those family incomes translate into average 
monthly incomes of $2,083 or less and $3,333 or less.  
As is discussed in detail in Section III.C above, the CFPB has sent hundreds 
of thousands of checks to consumers where the average check amounts were ap-
proximately $100 or more.161 Indeed, more than 177,000 checks were sent to 
consumers in cases where the average check amount was more than $1,000.162 
If one includes checks in cases where the average check amount is more than 
 
cases, though. See, e.g., Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 35–41, CFPB v. 
Equifax Inc., No. 1:19-cv-3300-TWT, (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2019). 
 153. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104(a)–(b). 
 154. § 1075.104(b). 
 155. § 1075.104(b)(2); cf. Velikonja, supra note 54, at 364–65 (noting that the SEC takes into account re-
lated actions when determining how much to pay investors from fair funds and refuses to pay more than necessary 
to compensate investors for “the full extent of their losses”). 
 156. § 1075.104(b)(2). 
 157. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. 
HOUSEHOLDS IN 2019, at 1 n.1 (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2019-report-economic-
well-being-us-households-202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/V68D-8HD2]; see also id. at 57–59 (describing the sur-
vey methodology).  
 158. Id. at 21. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 11. 
 161. See supra Section III.C and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra Section III.C and accompanying notes; see also infra Table 7. 
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$100, that number increases to more than 291,000, and if one includes the single 
case with an average check amount of $93.05, the number of checks sent in-
creases to just over 391,000.163 
TABLE 6 
Average Check Amount Is 
Greater Than:164 






These average check amounts—involving checks totaling $427.2 million 
for these eighteen cases—are significant by any measure.166 Moreover, as noted 
above, many cases involved unlawful fees for debt-relief or credit-repair ser-
vices.167 Purchase of these services suggests that the consumers in question al-
ready were in some financial distress, making the return of these funds even more 
significant.  
Furthermore, the above groupings mask the fact that thousands of consum-
ers are receiving checks with even higher average amounts. In cases in which the 
average check amount was between $1,000 and $5,000, the CFPB sent more than 
170,000 checks, and the average check amount for those cases was more than 
$2,000.168 Another approximately 115,000 checks were sent in cases where the 
average check amount was more than $200, and another almost 100,000 checks 
were sent in a case with an average check amount of $93.169 
  
 
 163. The average check amount is $93.05 in the one case with an average check amount above $75, but 
below $100. See supra Table 3; see also infra Table 6. The CFPB sent 99,338 checks in that case. 
 164. Because each row indicates the number of checks sent in cases where the average check amount is 
greater than a specified amount, the number of checks in any given row includes all of the checks in the higher 
rows as well.  
 165. As is discussed in supra Section III.C, the CFPB does not publish data on the number of consumers 
who received or cashed checks. 
 166. Cowie, supra note 1. 
 167. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
 168. See infra Table 7. 
 169. See infra Table 7. 
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TABLE 7 
Range of the Average Check 
Amounts 
Number of 
Checks Sent to 
Consumers in 




Cases in this 
Range170 
Greater than 
or Equal to Less Than 
$5,000            1,570 $8,652 
$1,000 $5,000 175,495 $2,155 
$100 $1,000 114,863 $228 
$90 $100 99,338 $93 
Even the average check amount in the two cases with the lowest average 
check amounts171 is still significant. The CFPB sent more than 500,000 checks172 
with an average check amount of $39 in these two cases.173 The fact that 63% of 
the more than $20 million distributed by the CFPB in these two cases was cashed 
by consumers is some indication that consumers felt that the amounts they were 
receiving were significant, at least significant enough to go through the effort to 
cash the checks.174 
In addition, the average check amounts paid from the Civil Penalty Fund 
compare very favorably to amounts paid to consumers for relief in similar situa-
tions. Over four years, 2016-2019, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) dis-
tributed checks to 9.9 million consumers averaging $101.175 By comparison, the 
overall average check amount from the Civil Penalty Fund is $494.176 Similarly, 
 
 170. This average is a weighted average for all of the cases with average check amounts in each range. The 
average for each range is calculated by summing the total amounts distributed in all of the cases in a given range 
and dividing that figure by the sum of all of the checks sent in all of the cases in that range. For example, if four 
checks were sent in a case with an average check amount of $100 and two checks were sent in a case with an 
average check amount of $500, the average check amount in that range would be ((100*4)+(500*2))/(4+2) = 
1,400/6 = $233. This weighted average is more informative than simply averaging the averages from the two 
cases, which would be (100+500)/2 = $300. Unless stated otherwise, all of the averages in this section are calcu-
lated using a weighted average. 
 171. $41 and $27 respectively. 
 172. 513,806 to be exact. See supra Table 3. 
 173. Cowie, supra note 1; see also supra Table 3. 
 174. The question here is not whether consumers felt that this amount adequately compensated them for 
their harm. It is impossible to infer their attitudes from this data. Rather, the question is whether they felt that this 
amount was significant to them given their budget and other demands on their time. Assuming that the benefit 
from cashing a check outweighs the costs of doing so, one would assume that an economically rational person 
would cash the check. A person could decline to cash either because the amount was relatively insignificant in 
the context of the person’s budget or because the costs of cashing the check (in time and fees) outweighed the 
value of the check. For some consumers, especially poorer or unbanked consumers, the transaction costs to cash 
the check could be higher than $41 or $27. The data here shows that despite the relatively low average check 
amounts recipients of 63% of these distributions elected to cash the checks. Cowie, supra note 1; see also supra 
Table 5. 
 175. FTC Refunds to Consumers: Calendar Year: 2016 to 2019, TABLEAU PUB., https://public.tab-
leau.com/profile/federal.trade.commission#!/vizhome/Refunds_15797958402020/RefundsbyDate [https:// 
perma.cc/R7HP-HYSS] (Jan. 5, 2021). This comparison is not perfect. The FTC refunds consumers’ money by 
using money the FTC collected from the defendants in the same case, and thus, these amounts may not reflect 
the total harm. Also, the types of cases enforced by the FTC and the CFPB are not identical; therefore the FTC 
may provide refunds in cases that involve violations that the CFPB could not prosecute. 
 176. Cowie, supra note 1. 
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for 2017 and 2018, most of the money distributed in the FTC’s initial distribu-
tions went to consumers in cases where the average refund177 was between $100 
and $1,000.178 That range represented 66% of the total initial distributions, and 
the average refund to all consumers from cases in that range was $401.179 By 
contrast, 84% of the money distributed through the Civil Penalty Fund was sent 
to consumers harmed in cases where the average check amount ranged between 
$1,000 and $5,000, with the average check amount in that range being $2,155.180 
As with the Civil Penalty Fund, the FTC also sent most consumers (86% of the 
total) refunds in cases where the average refund was less than $50. Only 57% of 
the Civil Penalty Fund checks, however, were sent in cases where the average 
check amount was less than $50, and the funds distributed to those consumers 
represented only 5% of the total funds distributed from the Civil Penalty Fund, 
while 30% of the refunds provided by the FTC were in cases from this range.181 
In addition, almost 15% of the FTC’s refunds were in cases whether the average 
refund was less than $25.182 
Cox, Widman, and Totten examined 128 state enforcement cases in which 
consumers received compensation.183 These cases primarily provided relief to 
consumers that were identified specifically in the orders, and typically involved 
relatively few consumers (more than half involved less than ten consumers).184 
In the forty-two cases in which consumers in a given case received the same 
amounts, the average payment was $3,010 and the median $1,000.185 In the 
eighty-six cases in which consumers received different amounts, the average 
high and low payments were $6,030 and $648 respectively, and the median high 
and low payments were $2,431 and $250 respectively.186 These numbers are not 
directly comparable to the average check amounts from CFPB distributions, as 
they do not include the mean or median for each case, but the CFPB issued thou-
sands of checks in cases where the average check amounts were comparable. 
 
 177. In the 2017 FTC REFUND REPORT, the FTC reported the average refund for each case. FTC, OFFICE OF 
CLAIMS AND REFUNDS ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 3–4 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/re-
ports/bureau-consumer-protection-office-claims-refunds-annual-report-2017-consumer-refunds-effected-july/ 
redressreportformattedforweb122117.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z5A-8DG5]. In the 2018 FTC REFUND REPORT, the 
FTC reported only the median refunds for each case, but the average could be calculated by dividing the figures 
provided for the amount mailed for each case and for the number of consumers, which mirrors the calculation of 
the average in the 2017 FTC REFUND REPORT. Id.; OFF. CLAIMS AND REFUNDS, FTC, 2018 FTC ANNUAL REPORT 
ON REFUNDS TO CONSUMERS 2018, at 3–4 (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/2018-an-
nual-report-refunds-consumers/annual_redress_report_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA65-ZVR4]. 
 178. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra Tables 3 & 7. 
 181. See supra Table 3. 
 182. Cowie, supra note 1. 
 183. Cox, supra note 2, at 78. 
 184. Id. (noting that the average number of consumers receiving relief was 125 and the median was eight 
from 141 cases, although they could identify the amount of the payment only in 128 cases). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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As another example, the CFPB’s use of the Civil Penalty Fund compares 
favorably to the relief consumers have received in class actions.187 The FTC con-
ducted a study of relief provided to consumers through class actions.188 That 
study found that the average compensation was $79 and the median compensa-
tion was $69, with one-quarter of the cases having a median of $22 and one-
quarter a median of $200 or more.189 The CFPB analyzed settlements in more 
than 200190 class-action cases involving consumer financial products or services 
and found that consumers received approximately $32.191 
Both the FTC, the states, and class actions are limited in an important way 
that the CFPB is not; they can only provide consumers with relief from the 
money available from the defendants that specifically harmed them. When those 
defendants do not have sufficient resources, consumers cannot receive full relief. 
These situations are comparable to Bureau-administered relief, which also relies 
solely on money collected from the defendants who caused the specific harm. 
The Civil Penalty Fund squarely addresses this problem. 
  
 
 187. An analysis of the benefits and costs of private enforcement of consumer laws through class actions is 
beyond the scope of this paper; however, it is worth noting that there undoubtedly is a significant amount of 
unlawful conduct that is neither prosecuted by government regulators nor enforced through private actions (either 
individual or class actions). In addition, in those instances in which a case is filed, most of the time there is either 
a government enforcement action or a private action, but not both. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT §1028(A) §§ 
1.3, 1.4.8, at 8, 17–18 (2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-con-
gress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9CA-C2RJ] (noting that in its survey of 1,150 cases filed by enforcers, it was 
not able to find a related private class action in 88% of the cases, and that in its survey of 114 private class actions, 
it was not able to find a related government action 66% of the time). Thus, the point of this section is not to say 
that these other types of cases do not reach appropriate resolutions, especially in the typical case where the alter-
native is no recovery at all for the consumers, but rather that the typical checks sent from the Civil Penalty Fund 
are providing significant monetary relief to consumers. 
 188. 2019 FTC CLASS ACTION REPORT, supra note 105. As with the FTC comparison, the class action data 
set included cases that the CFPB could not prosecute. See id. at 19 fig.3 (noting that data set included cases 
involving product malfunction and anticompetitive conduct). 
 189. Id. at 21 tbl.2, 23 n.41. 
 190. The CFPB analyzed 419 cases in total, but not every case had sufficient detail to allow an analysis of 
the relief consumers received. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 187, § 8.1, at 3 n.4. 
 191. Id. at 27; Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210, 33,234 n.335 (July 19, 2017) (disapproved 
under the Congressional Review Act on Nov. 1, 2017, PL 115-74, and removed from the code of federal regula-
tions on Nov. 22, 2017). Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,500, 55,500 (Nov. 22, 2017)) (noting that 
although the two datasets in the CFPB Arbitration Study were not congruent, the CFPB “believes that this $32-
per-class-member recovery figure is a reasonable estimate”). The CFPB noted one multi-district litigation in-
volving 18 settlements that provided $1 billion in monetary relief to 29 million consumers, which averages to 
$34 per consumer. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 187, § 8, at 39–40. 
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C. Absent the Existence of the Fund, These Consumers Likely Would Receive 
Little or No Relief 
A revolutionary aspect of the CFPB’s Civil Penalty Fund is that it can pro-
vide relief to consumers when the defendants who harmed those consumers do 
not have enough money to make the consumers whole.192 It does so by using the 
penalties paid by all defendants for violating consumer laws to provide relief to 
consumers harmed by those defendants who do not have sufficient assets to pro-
vide relief themselves. Absent the relief provided through the Civil Penalty Fund, 
the consumers in these cases likely would have received little or no relief.  
1. In Most Cases in Which the Fund Is Used, the CFPB, Rather than the 
Defendants, Has Remediated the Vast Majority of the Consumers’ Harm 
The defendants in the twenty-seven cases for which the CFPB has allocated 
funds from the Civil Penalty Fund193 caused $706.2 million194 in harm to con-
sumers—under the narrow definition of compensable, uncompensated harm in 
the Civil Penalty Rule. But these defendants paid only $46 million of that 
harm,195 or roughly seven cents for each dollar of harm they caused. Absent pay-
ments from the Fund, the consumers in these cases most likely would receive no 
compensation for 93% of their harm, resulting in more than $660.2 million196 in 
compensable but uncompensated harm.  
Even these figures understate the amount of unremediated harm consumers 
would have in a typical case if the Fund did not exist. As an initial matter, just 
 
 192. See, e.g., Brief for the CFPB as Amici Curiae supporting Respondents, Linton v. Consumer Prot. Div., 
225 A.3d 456 (Ct. App. Md. Nov. 6, 2019) (No. 2019-33) (“[T]he Fund is used principally to compensate con-
sumers who were harmed by violations of Federal consumer financial law and who were not fully compensated 
through the relevant [CFPB] enforcement action, often because the defendants lacked sufficient financial re-
sources to fully remediate the harm they caused.”). 
 193. This analysis includes the cases resolved by March 31, 2019. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 194. This amount includes $35 million in Bureau-administered redress paid to consumers and $671.2 mil-
lion allocated from the Fund for payment to consumers. Defendants in a given case may be ordered to pay redress 
to the CFPB, rather than paying redress directly to the consumers they harmed. When this happens, the CFPB 
uses the funds to provide Bureau-administered redress to the consumers harmed by those specific defendants. 
These payments are separate from payments from the Fund. None of the defendants in these 27 cases paid redress 
directly to consumers, although thirteen paid redress to the CFPB in addition to paying civil money penalties. 
The amount of Bureau-administered redress understates the actual amount of harm to consumers because in three 
of the cases, the defendants have paid redress to the Bureau—and therefore their payments are included in the 
$46 million that the defendants paid—but the CFPB had not published any data on its distribution of those monies 
as of the writing of this Article—and therefore those payments are not included in the $35 million figure for 
Bureau-administered redress (and thus are not included in the total harm). When that redress is known and in-
cluded in the total harm, the percentage of harm remediated by defendants will decrease and the amount of un-
remediated harm will increase. 
 195. This figure includes both amounts paid as redress and as penalties. The defendant in only one of these 
twenty-seven cases, Amerisave Mortgage Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0010 (Aug. 12, 2014), paid more to the 
Bureau than the harm it caused. This figure and the subsequent percentages do not include the amount Amerisave 
paid beyond the harm it caused, as doing so artificially decreases the unremediated harm in the remaining cases. 
 196. This analysis conservatively assumes that all of the money paid by defendants to the CFPB (including 
both money paid for redress and civil money penalties) would have been paid directly to consumers with no 
decreases due to administrative costs. 
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one case accounts for roughly 35% of the total paid by defendants in all twenty-
seven cases.197 
Additionally, in half of the cases, the defendants paid less than 1% of the 
harm they caused.198 In six of those cases, the defendants paid $5 or less while 
causing an average of $9.8 million in harm.199 The consumers in these six cases 
would receive, effectively, no compensation for their harm without the Fund—
resulting in a total of $59 million in unremediated harm. In another seven cases, 
the defendants paid more than $5 but less than 1% of the harm they caused,200 
resulting in a total of $243.5 million in unremediated harm if the Fund were not 
used. All told, in these thirteen cases, the defendants paid less than 0.3% of the 
harm they caused, leaving a total of $302.5 million in harm to be covered by the 
Fund.  
 
 197. Amerisave Mortgage Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0010 (Aug. 12, 2014). Amerisave is an unusual 
case in many respects. First, it is the only case in which the Fund was used where the defendants paid more to 
consumers than the CFPB did. Second, the defendants in that case are the only defendants who paid more in 
redress and penalties than the amount of harm they caused (as calculated by the Civil Penalty Fund Rule). The 
Amerisave defendants paid $14.9 million to the CFPB for redress and another $6 million in civil money penalties 
(roughly $20.9 million combined). Id. However, they caused $15.9 million in harm to consumers. Finally, the 
average check amount in the distribution for this case was the lowest of all the cases. See supra Table 5. By 
contrast, the average check amount for the Bureau-administered redress in Amerisave was $150. It is not clear 
from the publicly available information why the CFPB allocated funds to the Amerisave matter rather than simply 
ordering Amerisave to remediate consumers fully. Amerisave clearly had enough money to remediate consumers 
completely itself. It paid $14.9 million in redress, and paid a civil money penalty that was higher than the amount 
allocated from the Fund—the only instance in which that occurred. One possible explanation is that the CFPB 
either underestimated the amount of harm when it structured the consent order or discovered additional harm 
after the order had issued. The fact that the average check amount from the Bureau-administered redress was so 
much higher than the average check paid from the Fund ($150 versus $27 respectively) suggests that the CFPB 
found some additional harm after the settlement. Either way, because the amount of additional harm was lower 
than the penalty paid, the defendants ultimately did cover the entire amount of harm themselves. 
 198. Harm is defined as the amount allocated from the Civil Penalty Fund plus any amounts paid to con-
sumers as Bureau-administered redress. For these cases, those two amounts equal consumers’ compensable harm 
as that term is defined in the Civil Penalty Fund Rule. This analysis and the analyses that follow are derived from 
twenty-six of the twenty-seven cases. The analyses exclude Triton Mgmt. Grp., Inc., CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-
0005 (July 19, 2018). In that case, the defendants paid redress to the CFPB, but the CFPB had not yet reported 
on how much it distributed in Bureau-administered redress to the consumers harmed in those cases. Although the 
amount of redress paid by defendants to the CFPB is usually very close to the amount in Bureau-administered 
redress ultimately paid by the CFPB to consumers, there have been differences, and in this case, a difference 
could be significant. Assuming that the Bureau-administered redress roughly equaled the amount of redress Tri-
ton Management paid to the CFPB, Triton Management will have paid approximately 1/3 of the more than $1.5 
million in harm it caused. Two other cases where the defendants had paid redress but the CFPB had not yet 
reported on the amounts of Bureau-administered redress were included. In one, CFPB v. Moseley, No. 4:14-cv-
00789-SRB (W.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2018), the CFPB received seized assets (ordered as redress to be paid to the 
CFPB) after it already had allocated funds to the harmed consumers. Therefore, the seized amounts should not 
increase the harm remediated. In the other, Bureau Cons. Fin. Prot. v. Howard, No. 8:17-cv-00161-JLS (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 27, 2019), the amount of redress paid by the defendants was de minimis compared with the amount of 
harm caused ($50,000 in redress paid versus over $35 million in harm), such that it will not have a significant 
impact on the analyses.  
 199. See infra Table 8. 
 200. See infra Table 8. 
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In almost 70% of the cases, the defendants paid less than 5% of the harm 
they caused.201 In addition to the cases from the prior paragraph, there were an-
other five cases in which the defendants paid less than 5% (but more than 1%) 
of the harm they caused.202 Absent the use of the Fund, the consumers in these 
five cases would have had an additional $47.7 million in unremediated harm. 
The defendants in these five cases collectively paid only 4% of the harm they 
caused. 
In seven of the remaining cases, the defendants paid more than 5% of the 
harm they caused,203 but the Fund still provided vastly more relief to consumers 
harmed in those cases than the defendants could have. Collectively, the defend-
ants in these seven cases caused $336.2 million in harm, but the CFPB reim-
bursed consumers for more than 92% of that harm, while the defendants collec-
tively paid less than 8%.204 In total, using the Fund, the CFPB allocated $309.5 
million to consumers in relief beyond the amounts paid by the defendants in those 
six cases, an average of almost $44.2 million covered by the Fund per case. 
TABLE 8 
Harm Covered by  






ated Harm Per Case 
Less than $5 6 $59,000,000 $9,800,000 
Between $5 and 1% 7 $243,500,000 $34,800,000 
Between 1% and 5% 5 $47,700,000 $9,500,000 
More than 5% 7 $309,500,000 $44,200,000 
100% 1 $0 $0 
Total206 26 $659,700,000  
 
Thus, the defendants in most cases paid amounts that remediated little to 
none of the harm they caused. Although, on average, the defendants in these 
cases paid less than 7% of the harm they caused, the median amount of harm 
covered by defendants in individual cases was less than 1%. Indeed, almost 70% 
of defendants paid less than 5% of the harm they caused, and half paid less than 
1%. Just under one-quarter paid less than $5, effectively zero.  
2. In Most Cases, the Defendants Had Limited Financial Resources or Were 
Out of Business, and Consumers Likely Could Not Receive Compensation 
From Any Other Source 
In resolving enforcement actions, enforcers always should strive to require 
defendants to remediate harmed consumers fully. In determining whether to set-
tle a given case and the specific terms on which to settle, however, enforcers 
 
 201. See infra Table 8. 
 202. See infra Table 8. 
 203. See infra Table 8. 
 204. The percentages in these seven cases were 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 19, and 36% respectively.  
 205. Figures for both the totals and the averages are rounded to the nearest $100,000. See Table 4 n.4. 
 206. If Triton Management were included, the total unremediated harm likely would be approximately 
$660.7 million for all twenty-seven cases. See discussion supra notes 136, 198.  
COWIE (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/13/21  9:29 PM 
1452 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
must balance a multitude of competing factors: What are the defendants’ finan-
cial resources? How many of those resources will be depleted by ongoing litiga-
tion costs? Even if the enforcer ultimately wins, how many of those resources 
will be recoverable by the enforcer? How much additional delay in providing 
relief to consumers will be caused by continuing litigation? How much harm will 
that delay cause? How much new harm will the defendants’ illegal practices 
cause—both to new and existing consumers—while the litigation is ongoing? 
How much harm will other market actors cause through similar actions before 
the resolution becomes public? What are the risks of ultimately losing the litiga-
tion? In fact, the CFPB is required by statute to consider “the size of financial 
resources” of the defendants in determining the amount of any civil money pen-
alty.207 While ordering defendants to remediate all harmed consumers fully is 
obviously the ideal, and one the CFPB has achieved much of the time,208 in prac-
tice, that result is not always feasible. 
In most of the cases (eighteen of twenty-seven) where funds were allocated 
from the Civil Penalty Fund, the information available in the relevant orders sug-
gests that the defendants did not have sufficient resources to remediate the hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in harm they caused consumers.209 In eleven of the 
twenty-seven cases, the orders either expressly determined that the defendants 
had an inability to pay or set the amounts ordered to be paid based on the defend-
ants’ sworn representations regarding their limited financial resources.210 In an-
other five cases, the defendants either were in bankruptcy or were ordered to 
cease operations completely.211 In another two cases, the defendants de-
faulted.212 
The defendants’ statuses in the remaining nine cases are not as clear from 
the orders. Based on reviewing the defendants’ websites as well as state-govern-
ment websites in states where the defendants were incorporated or operating, the 
artificial-person defendants in five of the nine cases appear to be no longer oper-
ating.213 In addition, the defendants in each of these cases were enjoined from 
participating in the relevant industry as a whole, rather than a simple injunction 
 
 207. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3)(A). 
 208. In 83% of the cases resolved prior to April 1, 2019, and where a civil money penalty was imposed, the 
CFPB determined that there was no remaining compensable, uncompensated harm, and therefore, no funds 
needed to be allocated from the Civil Penalty Fund. Again, it is important to recognize that remediating all harm, 
as that term is defined in the Civil Penalty Fund Rule, does not necessarily mean that consumers will not have 
other harm (e.g., stress, lost wages or opportunity costs from time spent responding to the unlawful conduct, etc.). 
 209. See, e.g., CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2015). 
 210. See, e.g., id. In one of these cases, an individual defendant also was sentenced to 120 months in jail 
and ordered to forfeit $49 million. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order as to Defendants Richard F. Moseley, 
Sr., et al., at 3, CFPB v. Moseley, No. 4:14-cv-00789 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2018).  
 211. Cowie, supra note 1. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Cowie, supra note 1. Based on this data, it is not possible to determine when the companies ceased 
operating; thus it is possible that one or more of them continued to operate for a time after the resolution of the 
CFPB enforcement action.  
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against violating the law or collecting unlawful fees.214 As a result, those defend-
ants lost access to a major—if not their sole—source of revenue.  
Thus, in twenty-three of the twenty-seven cases (85%), the available infor-
mation strongly suggests a lack of resources sufficient to remediate consumers 
fully. Collectively the defendants in these cases paid $22.8 million but caused 
$544.8 million in harm.215 Even if they could have paid significantly more than 
they did—which appears unlikely given their resources and operating statuses—
it seems unlikely that they could have made up the almost $522 million216 in 
remaining harm that will be remediated by the use of the Civil Penalty Fund.217 
In addition, it is unlikely that the consumers harmed in these cases could 
recover their damage from another source. First, the CFPB itself must determine 
that the consumers are not reasonably expected to receive compensation before 
it allocates any amount from the Fund.218 Second, given the demonstrated lack 
of resources from most of these defendants, it seems extremely unlikely that any 
individual, or even a class of individuals, could find private attorneys to bring an 
action against these defendants after the resolution of the CFPB’s enforcement 
action, especially if the order required the defendants to pay significant amounts 
to the CFPB and to cease operations, as many orders do. Third, although the 
average check amounts are significant to individual harmed consumers, in most 
cases they do not seem high enough to justify an individual action even if the 
 
 214. In four cases, the defendants were permanently enjoined, and in the fifth the ban was for five years. 
Stipulated Final Judgment and Order at 4, CFPB v. Prime Mktg. Holdings, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-07111 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 31, 2017) (permanently restraining defendant from, inter alia, “selling, assisting in the sale of, or adminis-
tering Credit Repair Services” or receiving remuneration from another’s sale of such services); Stipulated Final 
Judgment and Order at 4, CFPB v. Commercial Credit Consultants, No. 2:17-cv-4720 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2017) 
(ordering a five-year ban on providing “Credit Repair Services”); Stipulated Final Judgment at 3, CFPB v. Union 
Workers Credit Servs., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-4410 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2015) (permanently restraining defendant 
from offering or profiting from the offering of credit); Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent In-
junction, Civil Money Penalties, and Other Relief at 5, CFPB v. College Educ. Servs. LLC, No. 8:14-cv-3078 
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2015) (permanently restraining offering, or profiting from the offering of, “Debt-Relief Ser-
vice”); Stipulated Final Judgment and Consent Order at 4, CFPB v. Meracord LLC, No. 3:13-cv-05871 (W.D. 
Wash. Oct. 3, 2013), 2013 WL 5477618 (permanently enjoining defendants from providing payment-processing 
services for providers of a “Debt Relief Service or a Mortgage Assistance Relief Service”). 
 215. Cowie, supra note 1. 
 216. Id. If one considers only the eighteen cases where the orders made clear the status of the defendants, 
the defendants’ payments would have left $462.8 million in unremediated harm. 
 217. Amerisave is one of the remaining four cases, and those defendants actually paid more than the full 
amount of harm they caused. See discussion supra notes 195, 197. In the remaining three cases it is not clear 
from the publicly available information why those companies were not required to remediate consumers fully. In 
one of those cases, CFPB v. Global Client Sols., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-6643 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2014), the defend-
ants allegedly provided unlawful substantial assistance because they processed payments that allowed other par-
ties to collect unlawful advance fees. Complaint at 3–6, CFPB v. Global Client Sols., LLC, No. 2:14-CV-6643 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2014). Those other parties were not defendants in the case, and the defendants in Global 
Client Solutions collectively paid a substantial amount, just over $7 million, CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: FISCAL YEAR 2014 27, 37 (2014), https://files.consumerfinance. 
gov/f/201411_cfpb_report_fiscal-year-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC6E-EGC5]; 2016 FINANCIAL REPORT, su-
pra note 2, at 44 n.15, 48, everything they were ordered to pay. Stipulated Final Judgment and Consent Order at 
14, 16, CFPB v. Global Client Sols., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-6643 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2014).  
 218. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104(b) (2020).  
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defendants had remaining resources.219 “[P]arties generally do not state overall 
claim amounts in complaints,”220 but studies on arbitration and small claims 
court suggest that individuals typically do not arbitrate claims for these 
amounts221 or use small-claims courts for these types of claims.222 Thus, private 
actions following on CFPB enforcement actions against defendants with limited 
resources like these seem unlikely.223 
Furthermore, empirical data indicate that private suits often are not filed 
covering the same conduct prosecuted in government enforcement litigation. For 
example, the CFPB’s arbitration study surveyed 1,150 cases filed by enforcers, 
and did not find a related private class action in 88% of the cases.224 Similarly, 
in its survey of 114 private class actions, it was not able to find a related govern-
ment action 66% of the time.225 An analysis of the SEC’s use of fair funds to 
provide compensation to harmed investors also determined that in 78.8% of the 
217 fair-fund cases, there was no related action providing relief to the inves-
tors.226 
Defendants in enforcement actions in which the CFPB used the Fund typi-
cally caused far more harm than they could remediate themselves.227 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, their business practices resulted in limited assets, bankruptcy, or 
even jail, leaving consumers with no realistic recourse. Thus, for all the reasons 
 
 219. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 2, at 78. 
 220. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 187, § 6, at 3. 
 221. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Con-
sumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 76–77, 80 & n.176, 91–92 & n.294, 117 (2015) (discussing an Ernst & 
Young study of 226 arbitrations filed by consumers against lenders where the median amount was more than 
$15,000 and reviewing 4,839 arbitrations filed by consumers—in disputes not limited to financial services—and 
finding an average claim of $143,962 and a median of $10,000, but when more than 1,000 AT&T Mobility 
matters are removed—each of which claimed $10,000—the average increases to over $183,000 and the median 
to $15,000; all told, only 184, or less than 4%, of these cases involved claims less than $1,000); CFPB 
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 187, § 5, at 9–10, 23–24 (noting that in a survey of 1,847 arbitrations related 
to consumer financial services, affirmative claims by consumers averaged approximately $27,000 with a median 
of $11,500 and noting that only approximately twenty-five per year were $1,000 or under).  
 222. Relatively little empirical data exists on the use of small-claims courts. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, 
supra note 187, § 7, at 4. The available studies suggest that consumers do not use small claims court for claims 
like these, although the average claims amounts could be in the range of relief often provided by the Fund. See 
Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, The Iowa Small Claims Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. 
REV. 433, 487 tbl.G, 489 (1990) (finding that of 1,799 claims filed in small claims court only 4% were filed by 
individuals against businesses other than landlords and that most claims filed by individuals sounded in tort); 
Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Small Claims 
Court System, 37 USF L. REV. 315, 341–42 tbl.4 (2003) (finding that the average claim brought by an individual, 
regardless of type of claim or defendant, in small claims court was $2,219 with a median of $1,351). Requiring 
consumers to file thousands of cases in small claims court, however, would be vastly more inefficient on a variety 
of axes than using a civil penalty fund to provide consumers relief for harm caused by conduct found to be 
unlawful. 
 223. Cf. Velikonja, supra note 54, at 369 (noting that fair-fund cases filed where there were no related 
private actions included cases where the likely recovery made any private actions not “cost effective,” where the 
defendants were “judgment-proof,” or the fair fund had fully compensated the harmed investors). 
 224. See CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 187, § 1, at 17; see also discussion supra note 187. 
 225. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 187, § 1, at 17–18. 
 226. Velikonja, supra note 54, at 388. In cases where government and private actions both provided relief, 
the provision of relief often is coordinated. See discussion supra note 143. 
 227. See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
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discussed above, the consumers harmed by these defendants likely would receive 
no relief for the vast majority, if not all, of their harm absent the existence and 
use of the Civil Penalty Fund. 
D. The Civil Penalty Fund Efficiently Remediates a Tremendous Amount of 
Consumer Harm with Minimal Administrative Overhead 
The Civil Penalty Fund primarily pays for itself,228 and it is a very efficient 
way to distribute funds to harmed consumers. The CFPB does not publish de-
tailed information about the operating expenses for the fund. Through November 
2019,229 however, the amount set aside for operational costs represents less than 
1% of the amounts allocated from the Fund, and 1.3% of the amounts already 
distributed from the Fund, a very good ratio of overhead to relief delivered.230 
This ratio also compares favorably with the FTC’s rate of 2.1% for the adminis-
trative expenses over four years of providing refunds to consumers.231 Further, 
95% of the allocations have been to consumers to remediate harm caused by 
defendants.232 Even assuming that none of the money set aside for administrative 
expenses went to start-up costs, the Bureau has distributed at least $74 for each 
dollar set aside, and allocated $111.233 Again, ignoring any set-up costs, the Bu-
reau set aside $6.71 for every check sent although the average check amount 
across all of the distributions was $494,234 meaning the amount set aside per 
check is 1% of the cost of distributing the average check amount. Importantly, 
setting aside amounts for administrative expenses has not prevented the Fund 
from providing full relief to all consumers with compensable harm. 
The amount set aside through February 2020 has covered the costs of set-
ting up the fund, completing 16 distributions, starting another 4, and determining 
uncompensated harm and allocating monies to cover those harms in seven addi-
tional cases.235 As of November 2019—using penalties paid by defendants and 
respondents for their unlawful conduct—the $6.1 million set aside236 allowed the 
 
 228. See generally 2016 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 29–33. 
 229. As of February 2020, the CFPB had not published data regarding any set asides since the March 2019 
allocation.  
 230. See generally 2016 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 29–41. 
 231. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC Refunds to Customers (Jan. 5, 2021), https://public.tableau.com/ 
profile/federal.trade.commission#!/vizhome/Refunds_15797958402020/RefundsbyDate [https://perma.cc/ 
R7HP-HYSS]. 
 232. In addition to the administrative set-asides, the remaining difference, $28.8 million, was allocated for 
consumer education and financial literacy programs. See id.; 12 C.F.R. § 1075.107 (2020); 2016 FINANCIAL 
REPORT, supra note 2, at 30 (allocating $13.4 million for such purposes in 2013–15 and $15.4 million in 2016). 
 233. Given the delays in reporting information regarding distributions, this number may understate the ac-
tual figure if the CFPB had not published data on all distributions made. As of February 2020, the CFPB had 
finished at least one distribution, but had published only initial data on that distribution. 
 234. See Cowie, supra note 1. 
 235. The CFPB may use some of its full-time employees’ time in the operation of the Fund without “paying” 
for that time from the funds set aside for operational costs of the Fund. Yet, even if that is true, it seems likely 
that the costs of the distributions, which are done by third-party vendors, dwarf any such costs. 
 236. The Bureau set aside $6,073,322 through March 31, 2019 from the fund to cover administrative ex-
penses. Cowie, supra note 1. 
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CFPB to complete a remarkable amount of work, remediating $447.5 million in 
consumer harm (by sending over 905,000 checks to consumers harmed in twenty 
cases) and allocating an additional $190.9 million for consumers harmed in an-
other seven cases.237 
TABLE 9 












with Data on 
Cashing238 








4 $250,144,939 $224,326,019 85,753  
No Data On 
Distribution 7 $190,905,529    
Total 27 $671,166,734 $447,490,961 905,072 $192,430,905 
 
The totals in this chart actually understate the actual work completed by the 
Fund. There is a significant delay in reporting by the CFPB from the time it ac-
tually takes actions related to the Fund.239 For example, the Estimated Amount 
Cashed understates the actual amounts cashed, because one completed distribu-
tion is not included in that amount and at least four others had started, and there-
fore consumers presumably had cashed some checks, but the CFPB had not yet 
reported the cashing rates for those distributions. As another example, the distri-
butions listed as having no data may have begun although the CFPB has not re-
ported on that fact yet. 
Furthermore, the metrics actually understate the Fund’s effectiveness and 
likely will improve as the CFPB releases additional data. First, the CFPB has 
completed one distribution for which it had not yet published data, meaning that 
checks had been sent and cashed; including those cases will increase the amount 
distributed per dollar set aside and reduce the amount set aside per check. Sec-
ond, as more cases are distributed, the effect of any initial set-up costs will be 
spread across more cases, thereby reducing any impact. As a result, all of the 
metrics will improve. Third, it is possible that although the CFPB had not re-
ported any data, it had begun sending checks in some of the seven distributions 
 
 237. See infra Table 9. 
 238. Although the Bureau had completed sixteen distributions by December 16, 2019, it had published data 
regarding only fifteen of the distributions.  
 239. See, e.g., CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: FISCAL 
YEAR 2016 36–38, 46 (Nov. 15, 2016) (providing the first distribution data on the Culver Capital matter when 
that distribution began between October 1 and December 31, 2015, and the funds were allocated on November 
28, 2014). 
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for which there is no data. If so, the amount set aside per check again would 
decrease and the amount distributed per dollar set aside would increase.  
The Bureau and the FTC have been able to achieve these levels of effi-
ciency in part by outsourcing the actual distributions to expert vendors and 
thereby incurring those costs only when necessary to complete distributions. Any 
other entity implementing a similar fund also could use vendors, and thus could 
set up a fund with only minimal burden on its existing staff and could use the 
fund to pay for the vendors. 
V. STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT CONSUMER RESTITUTION FUNDS TO 
PROVIDE MONETARY RELIEF TO HARMED CONSUMERS WHO OTHERWISE 
WOULD RECEIVE NONE 
States should consider implementing a consumer restitution fund to reme-
diate consumers harmed by violations of consumer law. 240 Although the CFPB’s 
Civil Penalty Fund is funded only by penalties, a state fund would not have to be 
so limited and could be funded by orders requiring disgorgement or payment of 
undesignated money into the fund in addition to orders requiring payment of 
penalties. As noted above, such a fund can provide substantial relief to consum-
ers with minimal overhead, can pay for itself, and can provide relief in situations 
in which it is extremely unlikely that the consumers would receive relief from 
any other source.241 Generally speaking, one would not expect most states to be 
able to operate a fund on the same scale as the CFPB, both because states often 
prosecute fewer cases and they typically collect lower penalties.242 Nonetheless, 
a state can operate a fund successfully even if it prosecutes relatively few con-
sumer cases or prosecutes cases primarily against small defendants. Furthermore, 
implementing a fund will encourage states to bring important cases they might 
not otherwise bring and will undermine potential incentives that might encourage 
undesirable prosecutorial decisions. 
  
 
 240. Although this section focuses on states, the same arguments could apply to tribes or to Congress in 
other contexts (e.g., allowing the FTC to implement a similar fund).  
 241. See discussion supra Sections IV.C, IV.D. 
 242. Compare infra Table 10, with Cox supra note 2, at 75 tbl.9 (noting mean and median net government 
money), and id. at 86 fig.8 (noting mean number of cases brought by states). The exception is the large multi-
enforcer cases, which included: seven total cases, each of which was joined by at least forty-two states. See Cox, 
supra note 2, at 58–59. These cases had a mean and median net government money that were significantly higher 
than the mean and median penalties collected by the CFPB. See id. at 75 tbl.9. It is not clear, however, how much 
government money any individual state received from these cases. 
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A. For a Fund to Operate, a State Must Have Authority to Collect Money 
from Defendants and Must Bring Cases Where Consumers Have 
Uncompensated Harm 
There are two basic preconditions that must be met for a fund to function: 
1) The relevant enforcers must have the power to collect money from defendants 
in consumer actions, e.g., penalties or other orders to pay money to the state that 
are appropriate given the facts of each case,243 and 2) such enforcers must pros-
ecute cases where the defendants do not have the resources to remediate the con-
sumers they harmed, meaning that there will be consumers with uncompensated 
harm.  
In a study of actions by states in 2014, Cox, Widman, and Totten reported 
data that indicate that both preconditions will be met for many states.244 First, 
state enforcers imposed penalties in 72.7% of the state cases in the study.245 
Thus, many, if not all, states already have the authority to seek penalties and 
actually exercise that authority.246 Second, they also found that state enforcers 
prosecute consumer cases that result in default judgments: forty-one states had a 
combined rate of default judgments in 6.6% of their cases; five other states had 
a combined rate of 14.1%, and six states had a rate of 32.2%.247 A default judg-
ment indicates that a defendant failed to defend against an enforcement action. 
Whether the default was because the defendant was insolvent, absconding, or 
something else, it seems likely that the enforcer will have trouble getting enough 
money from defaulting defendants to compensate harmed consumers fully. 
Given that many, if not all, states prosecute at least some cases that result in 
default judgments, there likely are consumers from at least those cases with un-
compensated harm. 
By comparison, the CFPB used its fund in 17% of eligible cases.248 In 
roughly 30% of the cases in which the Fund was used, the defendants did not pay 
the full amount of penalties imposed, and most of those cases involved at least 
one default judgment.249 Because the CFPB and courts must consider “the size 
 
 243. Although the money could be in the form of penalties, including disgorgement, a state also could au-
thorize its enforcers to order defendants to pay money into the fund in lieu of paying a penalty. Any such monies 
should be earmarked for use only by the consumer restitution fund. See infra Appendix A. If states allow private 
attorney general actions for consumer cases, those provisions would have to be modified so that penalties given 
to the state would go into the consumer restitution fund as well. Cf. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a),(f),(i),(j) (West 
2016); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, The New Qui Tam: A Model for the Enforcement of Group Rights in a 
Hostile Era, 98 TEX. L. REV. 489, 494 (2020). 
 244. See Cox, supra note 2, at 68–69. 
 245. Id. at 73–74. 
 246. If a state enforcer does not have this authority currently, the state legislature can provide that authority 
in the legislation that creates the fund.  
 247. See Cox supra note 2, at 63, 94 (noting that the states had an overall default rate of 15.5%, although 
that rate is skewed high by the states using two particular strategies, and that 6.4% of FTC cases resulted in 
default judgments). 
 248. Cowie, supra note 1. Consumers may receive payments from the Civil Penalty Fund only for activity 
for which a civil money penalty was imposed. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.103 (2020). This percentage reflects cases 
wherein at least one order imposing a penalty issued prior to March 31, 2019.  
 249. Cowie, supra note 1. 
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of financial resources” of parties when assessing penalties,250 many of the re-
maining cases involve defendants that pay the full amount assessed—and there-
fore do not default—but do not have sufficient resources to compensate fully the 
consumers they harmed. As noted supra, the defendants in those CFPB actions 
caused consumers substantial monetary harm.251 Similarly, consumers in the de-
faulted state actions likely also had unremediated harm, and as with the CFPB, 
it seems possible that there may be additional state actions wherein the defend-
ants do not default but cannot remediate fully the harmed consumers.252 
B. States Can Benefit from a Fund Even if They Prosecute Relatively Few 
Consumer Cases or Prosecute Them Primarily Against Smaller Defendants 
As long as a state can collect and distribute a significant amount253 to con-
sumers while covering its costs, a state can operate a successful fund. The key is 
that the state’s enforcers must pursue a mix of cases wherein enough penalties 
are collected to allow the fund to provide significant relief to those consumers 
harmed by defendants who cannot compensate them. This does not mean, how-
ever, that a state must prosecute a large number of cases or sue large defendants 
in order to operate a successful fund. Instead, a fund could be operated with a 
wide variety of enforcement strategies. 
As an initial matter, states that pursue a mix of cases similar to the mix 
pursued by the CFPB likely can operate a fund successfully. The CFPB brings a 
mix of cases against large entities (like banks), smaller entities, and individuals. 
For orders issued during the 2019 fiscal year or before, most of the orders were 
against non-banks or jointly against non-banks and individuals (71%)254 with 
 
 250. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3)(A). 
 251. See discussion supra Section IV.C.1. 
 252. A state enforcer may resolve an action in a way that does not provide complete relief to consumers 
based on a variety of legitimate concerns, including, inter alia, the reality that the defendants in question simply 
do not have sufficient resources, the realization that the enforcer likely would not be able to collect significantly 
more after litigation, the depletion of defendants’ resources from extended litigation, the harm to consumers from 
continued delay in receiving any compensation, the impracticability of calculating individual harm caused by the 
specific unlawful acts or practices, and the opportunity costs of the enforcer continuing this litigation rather than 
investigating and prosecuting other unlawful conduct. Cox, Widman & Totten found that state enforcers received 
public compensation in 62.8% of non-default cases, although 8.6% of the cases had no monetary compensation 
(e.g., rescission). Cox supra note 2, at 76–77. 
 253. Individual states could determine what level constitutes “significant” relief, but the CFPB has used its 
Fund when the average check amount was as low as $27, and thousands of consumers considered those checks 
worth cashing. See supra Sections III.D, IV.B for a discussion regarding the average check amounts and com-
parisons with relief in other types of actions. In cases where the typical amount per consumer would be too low 
to justify the cost of a distribution, a state could exercise its discretion not to allocate monies from the fund (either 
at that time or at all for those consumers). 
 254. Cowie, supra note 1. Fifty-six percent of the total of all orders were against non-banks alone and 16% 
of all orders were against non-banks and individuals jointly. Non-banks range in size from very large (e.g., 
Equifax, which paid a $100 million penalty) to quite small (e.g., Park View Law which had a single employee). 
Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 59–60, CFPB v. Equifax, Inc., No. 19-cv-
03300 (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2019); Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 4, CFPB v. Park View 
Law, Inc., No. 17-cv-04721 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2017). 
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another 21% against banks and 8% against only individuals.255 The CFPB col-
lected the entire penalty from the vast majority (93%) of orders imposing penal-
ties.256 The CFPB collected 100% of the penalties imposed on banks, 95% on 
non-banks alone, 86% on non-banks and individuals, and 73% on individuals 
alone.257 
The data indicate that the CFPB has prosecuted cases against defendants 
with a range of resources. Although the size of the average penalty collected is 
not a proxy for the size of the defendant, the ability to pay a large penalty indi-
cates significant resources, and the existence of a de minimis penalty suggests a 
lack of resources.258 The average penalty collected from a bank was $23.4 mil-
lion, although that figure drops to $8 million if two outlier penalties ($500 mil-
lion259 and $100 million260 respectively) are excluded. The average penalties col-
lected from other types of entities are much smaller. When one considers the 
medians and modes, it is clear that a few higher penalties skew the averages 
higher in all categories, and in fact, in the majority of cases, the penalties are 
significantly below the mean for that category. In addition, in each category aside 
from banks, there were instances wherein the defendants paid penalties of only 
one or two dollars, indicating that those defendants had few resources.261 
TABLE 10: PENALTY STATISTICS BY DEFENDANT TYPE 
Type of  
Defendant 
Bank Non-Bank Non-Bank and 
Individual 
Individual 





Median $4,550,000 $400,000 / 
$362,500 
$89,400 $1 
Mode $3,500,00 $100,000 $1 $1 
Minimum $34,000 $1 $1 $1 
Because the CFPB pursues this mix of cases, the Civil Penalty Fund has had 
sufficient monies to remediate all uncompensated, compensable harm to date. 
 
 255. Cowie, supra note 1; see also infra Table 10. 
 256. Cowie, supra note 1. 
 257. Id.  
 258. See 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3)(A) (requiring consideration of the defendants’ resources in determining 
the amount of penalties to be assessed). 
 259. In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Consent Order at 23–24, CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0001 (Apr. 20, 2018) 
(imposing a $1 billion penalty but remitting $500 million based on the payment to the OCC of a $500 million 
penalty for related conduct). See generally Craig Cowie, Is the CFPB Still on the Beat? The CFPB’s (Non)Re-
sponse to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 82 MONT. L.R. 41, 76 n.164 (2021) (discussing penalties of $100 million or 
more as outliers in the CFPB’s enforcement). 
 260. In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Consent Order at 17, CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 8, 2016) (im-
posing a $100 million penalty).  
 261. The CFPB has used the Fund in all cases in which an order imposed a one- or two-dollar penalty prior 
to April 1, 2019, and allocation data was not yet available for the orders issued after that date. 
 262. One case against a nonbank also resulted in an outlier penalty. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunc-
tion and Monetary Judgment at 60, CFPB v. Equifax, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03300 (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2019) (imposing 
a $100 million penalty). 
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Cox, Widman, and Totten found that states also sue “a large number of very 
small actors, yet also bring actions against some of the nation’s largest compa-
nies.”263 In particular, they identified an enforcement strategy264 pursued by 
some states wherein they prosecuted a large number of consumer cases against 
smaller entities and individuals mixed with cases against larger defendants, 
which correspondingly recovered greater monetary relief.265 In addition, the case 
volumes for the states pursuing this strategy and for the CFPB are comparable.266 
Given the similar mix of cases, it seems likely that these states could benefit from 
a fund just as the CFPB has benefited. 
The benefits of a fund, however, would not be limited just to those states 
with a strategy similar to the CFPB’s. A number of states prosecuted a smaller 
volume of cases, but still pursued at least one larger defendant wherein they re-
covered relief higher than the median.267 If that large defendant caused harm that 
warranted a large penalty, the collection of that penalty could fund relief to many 
consumers in smaller cases.268 Also, some states outsourced their enforcement 
activities, pursued larger defendants, and received money “far greater than any 
other strategy.”269 In addition, those states obtained only government money 
(i.e., no redress for consumers) in almost half of those cases, suggesting that there 
might be substantial unremediated consumer harm, and the money in those cases 
was often given to the attorney general for “discretionary use,”270 meaning it 
might be possible to direct the funds toward providing relief to consumers in-
stead. In each of these cases, it seems likely that states pursuing these strategies 
would collect enough penalties to fund relief to consumers. 
 
 263. Cox, supra note 2, at 83; see also id. at 61 tbl.1 (noting that the statistics indicate “a number of cases 
against very large defendants), 93 fig.13 (noting percentages of cases against various sized defendants by en-
forcement strategy), 97 fig.18 (same). 
 264. This discussion does not assume that any given state uses any given strategy currently, as states can 
alter their strategies over time. Rather, it uses these strategies as a framework for assessing whether a state could 
use of a civil penalty fund successfully if it pursued such an enforcement strategy. 
 265. Cox supra note 2, at 84–85, 96–97 figs.16, 17 &18 (discussing strategy seven where states pursued 
cases against defendants with a range of sizes and recovered more net government money and public compensa-
tion than state actions from other strategies).  
 266. Through its 2019 fiscal year, the CFPB resolved an average of thirty-three orders per fiscal year (be-
ginning with fiscal year 2013) and imposed penalties in an average of twenty-six. See Cox, supra note 2, at 86 
fig.8. (noting the mean number of state enforcement actions). The average from prior to the CFPB’s 2013 fiscal 
year were excluded from this comparison because the CFPB did not have its complete authority until July 21, 
2011 (the designated transfer date). See 12 U.S.C. § 5582; Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252, 57,253 
(Sept. 10, 2010). The CFPB issued only two orders in fiscal year 2012, which was the first full fiscal year after 
the designated transfer date, far fewer than in any other fiscal year since. See also Peterson, supra note 2, at 1076 
(discussing how the CFPB began its enforcement activities). 
 267. Cox, supra note 2, at 84–85, 88 (discussing strategies two and three). 
 268. For example, large, multi-state actions that include all or nearly all states and the District of Columbia 
often include large penalties paid to participating states. See, e.g., Press Release, Cal. Dep’t Just., Attorney Gen-
eral Becerra Announces Settlement Against Equifax Providing $600 Million in Consumer Restitution and State 
Penalties (July 22, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-announces-settle-
ment-against-equifax-providing-600 [https://perma.cc/G8HR-SRM2 ] (stating that Equifax paid $175 million in 
penalties to the prosecuting states). 
 269. See Cox supra note 2, at 90–91 (discussing strategy four). 
 270. Id. 
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Even states that pursue relatively few consumer actions271 may benefit 
from a fund. Assume a state brings only three or four consumer cases in an av-
erage year with an average default rate of 7%. Such a state typically would have 
one default case every four years with thirteen cases that did not default. As long 
as defendants in the thirteen cases pay penalties that can cover a significant 
amount of uncompensated harm, the fund makes operational sense, as it will have 
minimal costs until the distribution for that one case272 and the operating costs 
are covered by penalties paid by defendants. In addition, a single large case might 
provide funds sufficient to remediate consumers harmed in many smaller 
cases.273 Ultimately, the only way a fund does not work operationally is if the 
enforcer consistently recovers so few penalties that the fund would not be able 
to remediate a significant amount of harm caused by defendants and the enforcer 
does not wish to alter its enforcement strategy (or cannot) by altering the mix of 
cases or bringing more cases.274 
Similarly, some states pursue a high volume of cases but recover relatively 
low amounts of relief (both in government money, including penalties, and in 
redress for consumers).275 Although these states also have had higher default 
rates,276 they also frequently specifically identify a small number of consumers 
who have been harmed by the defendants.277 If there are a small number of iden-
tified consumers in the defaulted cases as well, the penalties collected may be 
sufficient to provide significant relief to those consumers, especially given the 
high volume of cases. Thus, the fund may work even though the overall amount 
of relief may be low compared to other states or the CFPB.  
In addition, if the state typically is identifying a small number of consumers 
who are harmed, the structure of a fund could reflect that approach, resulting in 
lower overhead costs. For example, the fund could just be used to provide relief 
to consumers whose identity and harm are specified in an order. Such a structure 
would not have the scope of other funds but would be tailored to the individual 
state’s enforcement practices and would be more straightforward to administer. 
  
 
 271. Id. at 86 fig.8 (noting that the twenty-seven states in strategies one through four resolved an average 
of less than five cases, although there were states in both strategies three and four that received large amounts of 
relief). 
 272. The timing of the defaulted case may matter, especially in the initial years of the fund where the balance 
of the fund may be quite low. If the fund does not contain enough to compensate consumers fully, however, the 
state could either order a partial distribution or could exercise its discretion to wait until there are sufficient funds. 
See infra Appendix A. 
 273. See Cox, supra note 2, at 85 (noting that states using low-volume strategies three and four do have 
cases with large recoveries). 
 274. Even if a state has a history of not prosecuting consumer actions. See id. at 88 (identifying four states 
that brought zero UDAP cases in 2014), a legislature might mandate (or an enforcer might request) establishment 
of a fund in an attempt to incentivize (by creating reputational rewards) its enforcers to bring such cases. See 
discussion infra Section V.C. Obviously if there are no consumer cases, and therefore no identified classes of 
harmed consumers, establishing a fund does not make sense. See infra Appendix A. 
 275. Cox, supra note 2, at 91–95. 
 276. Id. at 94. 
 277. Id. at 93. 
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C. The Existence of a Consumer Restitution Fund Will Encourage Enforcers 
to Bring Important Cases and Undercut Potential Incentives Leading to 
Undesirable Outcomes 
Large defendants operate on a scale that means they can cause enormous 
amounts of harm when they violate the law, and it is important that enforcers 
prosecute such cases and impose commensurate penalties to deter future wrong-
doing.278 These defendants often have substantial legitimate lines of business and 
have the resources to pay redress and appropriate penalties. But as this Article 
demonstrates, defendants with few resources, and often with business models 
that cannot operate lawfully, also cause a significant amount of harm, and en-
forcers should prosecute them as well. 
As an initial matter, there is some debate as to whether enforcers should 
pursue “judgment-proof defendants.”279 Of course, if an enforcer prosecutes de-
fendants with limited resources, there is a risk, or even a likelihood, that the de-
fendants will not be able to pay much, either in penalties or in redress. This fact 
then raises the question of whether it is an appropriate use of limited enforcement 
resources to pursue such cases. Given the amount of harm these defendants can 
cause, as demonstrated herein,280 the answer is unequivocally yes,281 especially 
given that the defendants’ limited resources likely will prevent any private ac-
tion.282 
Simply stopping the harm is a significant goal in and of itself. As just one 
example, in an action against the Hoffman Law Group and others, the CFPB and 
the State of Florida seized the assets of the defendants, recovering more than 
$650,000 from them and ceasing their operations.283 Despite the defendants’ lim-
 
 278. See, e.g., Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 3, 49, 59–60, CFPB v. 
Equifax, Inc., No. 19-cv-3300 (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2019) (imposing a $100 million penalty and $425 million 
judgment for illegal conduct that harmed approximately 147 million consumers); Consent Order at 36, 45, In re 
Citibank, N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0015 (July 21, 2015) (imposing a $35 million penalty for illegal conduct 
that caused at least $700 million in harm to approximately 8.8 million consumers); Consent Order at 10, 24 & 
31, In re Bank of America, N.A., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-2014 (Apr. 9, 2014) (imposing a $20 million penalty 
for illegal conduct that caused over $459 million in harm to approximately 1.5 million consumers). 
 279. Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 884 
(2014) (noting concerns with enforcers failing to collect penalties from defendants with limited resources). 
 280. See discussion supra Sections III.B, IV.C. 
 281. This is not to say that an enforcer always should bring cases against defendants with limited resources, 
rather the fact that a defendant may have few resources should not rule out bringing a case. An enforcer’s deter-
mination whether to bring a given case always will depend on the enforcer’s policy goals and the specific facts 
of each case. See, e.g., Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
2313, 2350 & 2350 n.190 (2016) (noting that deterrence is a “core goal of civil law enforcement” and citing 
others). There are many valid considerations in addition to the amount of harm being caused, including, inter 
alia, establishing case law on a specific issue, deterring similar actions by other defendants, and training enforce-
ment attorneys on cases with lower stakes. 
 282. Given the defendants’ limited resources, if a government enforcer does not stop the conduct, it is not 
clear it will be economically viable for anyone else to do so. See discussion supra Section IV.C. 
 283.  Default Judgment & Ord. as to Corp. Defs. at 16–17, CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 
(S.D. Fla. May 28, 2015); Stipulated Final Judgment & Ord. as to Def. Benn Wilcox at 13–14, CFPB v. Michael 
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ited assets, however, they had caused more than $11.7 million in harm by col-
lecting substantial unlawful fees from distressed homeowners.284 Absent action, 
these defendants would have continued to hemorrhage the savings of already 
distressed consumers.  
Despite the benefit of bringing cases against defendants with limited re-
sources, there may be incentives against bringing such cases. Implementing a 
consumer restitution fund would create positive counter-incentives to bring such 
cases while also creating incentives that would encourage enforcers not to ignore 
larger defendants whose illegal conduct is having a widespread impact. In other 
words, a fund encourages enforcers to bring cases against a beneficial mix of 
defendants. 
Commentators have argued that financial incentives derived from large 
penalties will cause enforcement agencies to focus on “deep-pocketed” defend-
ants rather than cases like the above.285 These incentives arise both because some 
enforcers may keep the recoveries for their own use286 and because the enforcer 
will receive a reputational reward (i.e., good press) from the imposition, and col-
lection, of a large penalty.287 Although there is debate on this argument,288 the 
 
Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2015) (requiring defendant to turn over $90,000 in personal prop-
erty); Stipulated Final Judgment & Ord. as to Def. Michael Harper at 15–17, CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-
cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2015) (requiring defendant to turn over $50,000 in jewelry); Stipulated Final Judg-
ment & Ord. as to Def. Marc Hoffman at 14–15, CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 
2015) (requiring defendant to transfer rights to any outstanding estates or inheritances to the receiver).  
 284. The corporate defendants forfeited all remaining seized assets. Default Judgment & Ord. as to Corp. 
Defs. at 16–17, CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2015) (requiring defendants to 
pay the full balance of the receivership estate, and requiring any person holding corporate assets to turn them 
over); Stipulated Final Judgment & Ord. as to Def. Benn Wilcox at 13, 15–16, CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 
9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2015) (basing suspension of judgment on sworn financial documents and testi-
mony regarding his and the corporate defendants’ financial resources); Stipulated Final Judgment & Ord. as to 
Def. Marc Hoffman at 14, 16 CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2015) (same); Ord. 
at 15–17, CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2015) (same). 
 285. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 279, at 903 (“We have argued that, on balance, financially motivated 
public enforcement means more public enforcement; that such enforcement will tend to focus on maximizing 
financial recoveries rather than securing injunctive relief and, thus, often will target deep-pocketed defend-
ants[.]”). 
 286. Id. at 863; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2527 (West 2019) (mandating payment of penalties into 
a fund for payment of operational expenses related to enforcing consumer laws); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-143 
(2019) (requiring payment of penalties into either the general fund or a special revenue account for defraying 
certain expenses). 
 287. Bill Chappell, Wells Fargo Hit with $1 Billion in Fines Over Home and Auto Loan Abuses, NPR 
(Apr. 20, 2018, 9:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/20/604279604/wells-fargo-hit-
with-1-billion-in-fines-over-consumer-abuses [https://perma.cc/MDC2-T476];  Renae Merle, U.S. to Fine Wells 
Fargo $1 Billion–the Most Aggressive Bank Penalty of the Trump Era, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2018, 4:21 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/regulators-planning-to-slap-wells-fargo-with-1-billion-
fine/2018/04/19/ec1f58c6-4415-11e8-ad8f-27a8c409298b_story.html [https://perma.cc/KV5V-SJHE]; Patrick 
Rucker, Exclusive: U.S. Watchdog Seeks Record Fine Against Wells Fargo for Abuses–Sources, REUTERS 
(Apr. 9, 2018, 12:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-accounts-fine-exclusive/exclusive-u-
s-watchdog-seeks-record-fine-against-wells-fargo-for-abuses-sources-idUSKBN1HG2PO [https://perma.cc/B7 
RQ-ELFJ]. 
 288. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 2, at 80–83 (noting a sizeable number of FTC cases against a “large number 
of smaller entity defendants and related individuals” and of state enforcers against “a large number of very small 
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existence of a fund will eliminate the first incentive, and create a similar reputa-
tional reward for pursuing defendants that cannot pay huge sums, thereby coun-
teracting the second incentive.  
First, because any civil money penalties will be directed to a fund, rather 
than to the enforcer’s own coffers, there will not be a direct financial incentive 
to pursue only cases against defendants that can pay significant penalties. Sec-
ond, the fund will create a new incentive—in addition to the existing incentive 
simply to stop the substantial harm that defendants with limited resources can 
cause—to bring cases against defendants with shallow or empty pockets, because 
the enforcer will be able to receive a reputational reward by providing redress 
through the fund. In addition, if the fund remains unused, pressure will grow to 
bring cases where it can be used in order to avoid reputational harm from claims 
that the funds are being wasted. Third, while encouraging cases against defend-
ants with limited resources, the fund also creates an incentive for the enforcer 
not to focus solely on those types of defendants,289 because a fund will only gen-
erate reputational rewards if the enforcer pursues cases where the defendants can 
pay the penalties in addition to pursuing those who cannot. 
The use of a fund also allows an enforcer to signal to stakeholders—includ-
ing consumers, legislatures, and others—the importance of a case that might not 
otherwise be visible.290 First, absent a fund, an enforcer may have an incentive 
not to publicize the amount of harm caused when the defendant cannot remediate 
the harm. The enforcer can do nothing to remediate the harm, and if it publicizes 
the amount, it may just highlight that fact and be criticized as ineffectual. Second, 
although an enforcer can signal the importance of a case by imposing a signifi-
cant penalty, that signal may be seriously undermined if it becomes public that 
the defendants never paid the penalty. Third, the value of preventing future harm, 
from this defendant or others, is hard to quantify,291 especially if there is no in-
dication of the amount of harm already caused by these defendants. By contrast, 
if there is a fund, the enforcer has an incentive to publish the amount of harm it 
remediated through the fund. Stakeholders then can compare the harm addressed 
across various cases292 and can use the harm to estimate the benefit from pre-
venting the future harm as well.  
 
actors”). Cox, Widman & Totten also noted at least two categories of state enforcers that brought a large number 
of cases against “individuals or tiny businesses.” Id. at 85 (strategies five and six).  
 289. See, e.g., id. at 84–85, 87 fig. 9 (identifying a number of states in 2014 that prosecuted only, or primar-
ily, defendants and individuals with few resources). 
 290. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 279, at 879 (stating that “[e]nforcement is often invisible to those who 
benefit from it”). 
 291. Id. at 875. 
 292. This metric can be valuable even if a primary benefit of the enforcement action is requiring the de-
fendant to adopt affirmative measures (e.g., implement compliance systems), because it highlights the need for 
those systems. Of course, there will be cases where monetary harm to consumers is impracticable to quantify 
(e.g., the harm from an illegal kickback that does not have an easily determined impact on the prices paid by a 
consumer), but where the enforcer’s policy goals justify the action. 
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Indeed, Lemos & Minzner have noted that using penalties as a signal may 
be problematic,293 and any such concerns only grow if the defendants have de-
faulted or otherwise cannot pay them. Assuming arguendo that there is any in-
centive to impose steep, but toothless, penalties on defendants with few resources 
in order to justify the action (and receive a reputational reward), a fund allows 
enforcers to achieve a similar reputational reward and to demonstrate the im-
portance of the case by redressing the harm, while also providing actual relief to 
harmed consumers. Further, the harm arguably is a more accurate signal, as it 
reflects a direct impact on the marketplace from the defendants’ unlawful con-
duct.294 It also allows the stakeholders to compare cases and reach their own 
determination as to the importance of cases, whereas penalties reflect only the 
enforcer’s perspective. 
In addition, the payments themselves may act as a different kind of signal 
to consumers, informing them, and perhaps by extension their communities, 
about types of services or products that are unlawful. These consumers may then 
be less likely to be deceived in the first instance by similarly unlawful services 
or products or more likely to complain to the enforcer about other unlawful acts 
or practices.   
Because a fund encourages the prosecution of a mix of cases, it also gener-
ates valuable signals to other market participants, both those with substantial re-
sources and those without. Participants with resources understand their own pos-
sible exposure from engaging in similar conduct. They understand how the 
enforcer will quantify harm, and because the fund eliminates reputational penal-
ties that may result from transparency regarding a defendant’s lack of resources, 
they can evaluate the amount of penalties against a given defendant in the context 
of that defendant’s resources,295 and thereby make more accurate projections as 
to their own possible exposure based on their resources. They also understand 
that the enforcer will have incentives to pursue participants like them. Likewise, 
participants without resources will understand that their lack of resources will 
not make them immune to prosecution.  
A fund also creates an incentive to actually collect the penalties imposed. 
Lemos and Minzner have argued that some enforcers do not collect penalties and 
that—assuming they cannot keep the penalties themselves—they do not lose rep-
utation by failing to collect.296 For that to be true, it must be the case that the 
 
 293. See, e.g., Lemos & Minzner, supra note 279, at 877, 907 (“Penalty amounts are—at best—an imperfect 
metric for gauging the importance of any given case. . . . [Enforcers] may be tempted to use high-value monetary 
recoveries to make unimportant cases seem important”); cf. id. at 856–57, 869 (discussing similar concerns with 
civil asset forfeiture); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State At-
torneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 513 (2012); Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 45 (2014). 
 294. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 279, at 875. There may be additional impacts that harm alone cannot 
signal, like any competitive disadvantage faced by lawful actors. 
 295. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3)(A); see infra Table 10. For example, the CFPB has sought penalties of only 
$1 in some cases involving limited resources. 
 296. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 279, at 875, 886 
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failure to collect is unnoticed, at least to some audience. Even if the failure re-
mains hidden to the general public, including both consumers and other stake-
holders like legislatures, word will get around to potential defendants (and their 
lawyers) that the enforcers’ orders are toothless, drastically undercutting if not 
completely eliminating any deterrence effect from the orders. Having a fund, 
however, creates an incentive to collect the penalties, as otherwise the fund can-
not work. It also increases the likelihood that any failure to collect will become 
public, either because of reporting required by the legislation creating the fund297 
or because interested stakeholders will want to know why the fund is not being 
funded and used.  
The CFPB has collected in full at least 94% of the penalties imposed in 
orders from March 31, 2019, or earlier.298 Even among the cases where the 
CFPB’s Civil Penalty Fund has been used, because the defendants did not have 
sufficient resources to remediate the harm themselves, the defendants in twenty 
of the twenty-seven cases paid in full the amounts ordered.299 The CFPB and 
courts must take into account, however, the defendant’s resources in imposing 
penalties,300 and the total penalties imposed in nine of the twenty cases was $2 
or less.301 
Some may argue that a fund will create a perverse incentive to impose high 
penalties on one defendant, who can afford to pay them, in order to use those 
penalties to receive an additional reputational reward by remediating consumers 
harmed by a different defendant—in essence robbing Peter to pay Paul. An as-
sessment of the proper considerations in imposing civil money penalties is be-
yond the scope of this Article. Such an argument, however, has little merit. First, 
to avoid missing the forest for the trees, it bears noting that remediating consum-
ers harmed by unlawful conduct is in the public interest, and incentivizing such 
payments is in the public good. That being said, the ability to remediate consum-
ers in one case is not an acceptable consideration in the determination of an ap-
propriate penalty in another case. Penalties must be imposed based on only the 
facts of the case in question.302 If one assumes that enforcers will impose inap-
propriately large penalties in order to achieve reputational rewards, or in order to 
fund its operations, a civil restitution fund would not exacerbate that problem 
because the enforcer already has an incentive to impose as high a penalty as is 
possible, either to get the largest reputational reward from the imposition of the 
penalty itself or to collect the most money for itself. Furthermore, any incentive 
to increase the penalties to achieve a reputational reward from providing redress 
 
 297. See infra Appendix A. 
 298. Cowie, supra note 1. 
 299. Id. 
 300. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3)(A). 
 301. Cowie, supra note 1. 
 302. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(2) (establishing various maximum penalty amounts based, in essence, 
on whether the defendants recklessly or knowingly engaged in the unlawful conduct), § 5565(c)(3) (mandating 
consideration of various factors in determining penalty amounts, including the gravity of the violations, the 
amount of consumer harm, and the defendants’ financial resources).  
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to harmed consumers is far, far weaker than the possible direct incentive to in-
crease penalties created by a framework that requires penalties to be paid into the 
state’s general fund or allows them to be used by the enforcer itself—an incentive 
that a consumer restitution fund eliminates completely. To the extent one wishes 
to address the question of how to determine an appropriate penalty, one should 
address that question directly by creating statutory guidelines for the assessment 
of penalties, rather than approaching the question indirectly through an incentive 
structure and in so doing losing the opportunity implement a mechanism that will 
remediate consumers’ actual, substantial, monetary harm. 
D. In Creating a Fund, States Should Establish Guidelines on Its Operations 
As noted above, states can create a fund that is tailored to their expected 
volume of cases and scope of harm to be remediated. For example, a state with a 
small volume of cases might create a streamlined fund wherein payments go into 
the fund and payments are made from the fund only as directed by the orders in 
the relevant enforcement actions. Such a fund would require few resources and 
would be administratively simple. A state with a higher volume, on the other 
hand, may want to create a more formal structure that guides the exercise of dis-
cretion in allocating and distributing funds. Either way, states must decide on the 
appropriate balance of discretion and formal requirements (e.g., with respect to 
what money is paid into the fund and how payments are made from the fund). In 
so doing, states considering implementing a consumer restitution fund should 
consider three key issues: what money goes into the fund, who can receive pay-
ments from the fund, and what happens if the fund is not large enough to com-
pensate all of the consumers eligible to receive payments. By considering these 
issues at the creation of the fund, a state can avoid critiques of arbitrariness, fa-
voritism, or partisanship and can ensure that a fund operates as it intended. 
First, penalties imposed in CFPB enforcement actions must go into the 
Civil Penalty Fund, and no other payments by defendants do. States can require 
that payments in addition to penalties go into a consumer restitution fund, in-
cluding disgorgement or orders to pay amounts other than penalties into the fund. 
States also can make payments into the fund discretionary rather than mandatory. 
Making payments into the fund discretionary or allowing payments from the fund 
for anything other than remediating consumers, however, reduces stakeholder 
clarity regarding when and how the fund will be used, may expose the state to 
critiques regarding the use, and will undermine the incentive benefits derived 
from a fund.  
Second, the CFPB also limits payments to consumers harmed by defend-
ants who have been assessed a civil money penalty for the unlawful conduct that 
harmed the consumers303 and provides relief to all consumers harmed by that 
conduct,304 but neither is required. A state could allow payments to consumers 
harmed by defendants against whom any relief (e.g., injunctive relief) is ordered 
 
 303. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.103 (2020). 
 304. To the extent it is practicable to identify them and remediate their harm. See id. § 1075.104. 
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for violations that harmed the consumers or in cases in which the enforcer has 
proved harm from violations of consumer law but cannot identify the perpetrator 
(e.g., a default judgment against a Doe defendant). And as is noted above, states 
might limit relief to those individuals specifically identified in the orders. In or-
der to make remediation more effective and to lower administrative costs, en-
forcers should require defendants to produce information identifying harmed 
consumers whenever possible (e.g. contact information and data on the amount 
of harm suffered).305 
Third, the state will have to decide how to apportion funds if there are not 
sufficient amounts in the fund to compensate all of the uncompensated harm 
from the state’s relevant cases. The Civil Penalty Fund Rule leaves this to the 
discretion of those in charge of the fund. A state could do likewise, or it could 
require that there be available funds when its enforcers identify those who are 
eligible for payments. Because many consumers will benefit from even partial 
remediation, allowing for partial payments in some fashion likely is the best 
course, especially given that these consumers are not likely to recover anything 
from any other source. In addition, a state may want to consider limiting the 
rights to assign payments from the fund to ensure the relief goes completely to 
harmed consumers. Regardless of the ultimate determination, establishing these 
guidelines from the beginning will reduce claims of favoritism or arbitrariness in 
the way the funds are distributed. Sample language creating a fund is provided 
in Appendix A. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by the empirical analyses above, the CFPB’s Civil Penalty 
Fund efficiently provides consumers with substantial monetary relief, putting 
money back into consumers’ pockets in cases where consumers could get little 
or no compensation from the wrongdoers. The Fund has allocated more than 
$671 million in 27 cases through the end of the CFPB’s 2019 fiscal year. The 
defendants in these cases typically have caused individual consumers tremen-
dous amounts of harm. In the great majority of these cases, the average check 
sent from the Fund was $1,000 or more. But in 85% of the cases, the data strongly 
suggests that the companies who broke the law could pay very little back to con-
sumers, as they had few resources, were bankrupt, were ordered to cease opera-
tions, or went out of business. Overall, the companies in all 27 cases paid only 
for 7% of the harm they caused, and in half of the cases, they paid less than 1% 
 
 305. See, e.g., How the FTC Provides Refunds, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceed-
ings/refunds/how-ftc-provides-refunds (last visited May 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7Z4U-FGBH] (“FTC court 
orders typically require the company to provide a list of customers, their contact information, and how much each 
customer paid.”); cf. 2019 FTC CLASS ACTION REPORT, supra note 105, at 7 (noting that remediation by the FTC 
depends on the quality of the consumer data available); Velikonja, supra note 54, at 342 (noting that one of the 
two key factors the SEC considers in determining whether to distribute money from a fair fund to harmed inves-
tors is whether there is an identifiable class of victims with identifiable harm); 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104(b)(3) 
(providing for a pro rata share of the allocation if it is “impracticable to assess the uncompensated harm of indi-
vidual victims in a class”), 1075.109(a)(3) (deeming payments as impracticable when the “victim cannot be lo-
cated with effort that is reasonable in light of the amount of the payment”). 
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of the harm. The CFPB provided consumers with relief for the remaining 93% 
of their harm by using the Fund. In addition to providing consumers with relief 
that they otherwise likely would not get, the Fund creates incentives for govern-
ment enforcers to bring a healthy mix of cases, including cases against large de-
fendants with many resources as well as cases against smaller defendants with 
few resources who nonetheless cause substantial harm. 
States and other enforcers also have constituent consumers who are harmed 
by defendants who cannot pay consumers back, and these enforcers would ben-
efit in similar ways from the creation of a fund to provide harmed consumers 
with restitution. These enforcers could implement such a fund in a way that dove-
tails with their particular enforcement strategy, and even enforcers who bring 
relatively few consumer cases or prosecute cases primarily against smaller de-
fendants could operate a consumer restitution fund successfully. 
 
VI. APPENDIX A - MODEL LANGUAGE TO CREATE A CONSUMER  
RESTITUTION FUND 
There is established a separate fund, to be known as the “Consumer Resti-
tution Fund.” All civil money penalties306 collected as a result of any action pros-
ecuting violations of consumer law shall be deposited in the Consumer Restitu-
tion Fund.  
Monies deposited in the Consumer Restitution Fund may be used only for 
payments to consumers for harm from violations of consumer law that are pros-
ecuted in actions for which a final order has issued. Determinations regarding the 
use of monies in the Consumer Restitution Fund must be made regularly, and on 
at least an annual basis. 
Reports regarding the operation of the Consumer Restitution Fund, includ-
ing descriptions of the monies paid into the Consumer Restitution Fund, the pay-
ments made from the Consumer Restitution Fund, and the costs of operating the 
Consumer Restitution Fund, must be published regularly, and on at least an an-
nual basis.  
This Act does not create a right to a payment from the Consumer Restitu-
tion Fund of any amount for any person, and this Act does not create a private 
right of action for any person with respect to a payment from the Consumer Res-
titution Fund to that person or any other person. 
  
 
 306. Note: Other existing laws regarding the imposition of civil money penalties and where they must be 
deposited may have to be amended to conform with the intent of this Act. In addition, if the Department does not 
have the authority to seek penalties in Consumer Enforcement Actions currently, that authority will have to be 
added as well. Finally, in resolving matters, the Department should be sure to include language making the failure 
to comply with the settlement’s terms (including the payment of civil money penalties) a violation of the settle-
ment that the Department may prosecute independently without litigating the underlying violations of Consumer 
Law and should require the defendants to waive any right to contest the underlying facts in any action regarding 
a breach of the settlement. 
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Definitions: 
•   “Consumer” means a person who purchases or leases goods, services, 
real property, or information primarily for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes. 
•   “Consumer Law” means [define the state laws to be considered con-
sumer law, e.g., the state consumer protection act, and for which reme-
diation from the Fund will be possible] and Federal consumer financial 
law, as that term is defined at 12 U.S.C. 5481(14). 
•   “Final Order” means a consent order, settlement, stipulation, or other 
court order that is no longer appealable and for which no appeals are 
pending. For purposes of this definition, “appeals” includes any peti-
tions for reconsideration, rehearing, or certiorari. 
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